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COURTING DISASTER: CLIMATE CHANGE AND
THE ADJUDICATION OF CATASTROPHE
R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar *
Do we court disaster by stretching the bounds of judicial authority to address problems of
massive scale and complexity? Or does disaster lie in refusing to engage the jurisgenerative
potential of courts in a domain of such vast significance? This Article examines global climate
change adjudication to shed light on these questions, focusing particularly on cases that seek to
invoke the norm articulation and enforcement functions of courts. The attempt to configure
climate-related harms within such substantive frameworks as tort and constitutional law is
fraught with analytical and practical difficulties. Yet the exercise, we argue, is essential.
Against the backdrop of a potentially existential threat, judges redeem the very possibility of law
when they forthrightly confront the merits of climate lawsuits. Conversely, when they use weak
preliminary and procedural maneuvers to avoid such confrontation, judges reinforce a sense of
law’s disappearance into the maw of normative rupture.
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LEGAL ORDER

“This is no ordinary lawsuit.”1
Climate change challenges the capacity of law. This is true, first of all, as
a historical matter. Most notably, despite decades of warnings from the scientific community, the United States Congress has never passed a law specifically to control greenhouse gas emissions.2 President Obama resorted to
administrative action in an effort to impose some constraints on greenhouse
gas emissions. But the centerpiece of that effort, the Clean Power Plan, is
stayed pending judicial review and will almost certainly be dismantled by the
new administration.3 Meanwhile, at the international level, nations have
struggled to turn the promises of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change into the kind of collective commitment and regulatory
structure necessary to avoid dangerous levels of climate change.4 The President has given conflicting signals on actually withdrawing from the Paris
Agreement or the underlying Framework Convention, but his overall
approach toward energy and environmental protection have clearly rattled
the global climate regime. Thus, the future of international climate change
diplomacy and concomitant efforts to subject greenhouse gas emissions to a
regime of legal limitations remains far from certain.
This Article does not focus on these political failures, though their consequences will be dire indeed. We are concerned, rather, with the more
profound ways in which climate change destabilizes the concept of law. Put
simply, our normative order looks increasingly fragile in “an era of unlimited
harm.”5 Climate change will increase the risk of not only relatively “normal”
disasters, but also of truly catastrophic ones. Indeed, climate change may
1 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1234 (D. Or. 2016).
2 Congress has passed two statutes to fund federal research on climate change science. See National Climate Program Act, Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92 Stat. 601 (1978) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908 (2012)); Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101606, 104 Stat. 3096 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2921–2961 (2012)).
3 See West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016) (mem.); see also Lisa Heinzerling,
The Supreme Court’s Clean-Power Power Grab, 28 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 425, 425 (2016); Ann
Carlson, The Decision to Halt the Implementation of the Clean Power Plan Is Outrageous (And
Inconsistent with the Law), LEGAL PLANET (Feb. 9, 2016), http://legal-planet.org/2016/02/
09/the-decision-to-halt-the-implementation-of-the-clean-power-plan-is-outrageous/. Court
watchers expect a decision from the circuit court in 2017. See Amanda Reilly, Obama’s
Climate Rule Has Its Long Day in Court, GREENWIRE (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/
greenwire/stories/1060043514.
4 See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2015 (2015).
5 Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of
Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 350 (2011).
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routinize catastrophe itself.6 This Article explores the challenges and paradoxes of routine catastrophe and legal order, with particular attention to the
role of tort law (and, importantly, tort-like constitutional obligations of government actors) as a forum for the airing of grievances unaddressed by other
legal and social mechanisms. We begin in this Introduction by defining the
specific normative challenge posed by catastrophe and by identifying climate
change as a particularly vexing threat to social meaning and justice.
A. Catastrophe as Normative Overturning
The rise of disaster law as a distinctive field of study has highlighted the
difficulty of precisely defining “disaster.”7 Dan Farber notes the “common
conception” of “events that are sudden, significant, and natural.”8 But he
goes on to elaborate the indeterminacy of these criteria on closer inspection.
Sociologists have emphasized the special power of disaster to tear the social
fabric, disrupting normal patterns of communal life.9 Richard Posner, in his
distinctive and provocative treatment of catastrophe, focused on those events
marked by “utter overthrow or ruin” that “threaten the survival of the human
race.”10 Such empirical approaches attempt to describe disaster as a particular set of observable circumstances.
An alternate approach can be illustrated through a well-known historical
case. On February 26, 1972, a pile of coal slag impounding black wastewater
collapsed in a hollow in West Virginia. The Buffalo Creek Mining Company
had been dumping coal ash and refuse in the upper reaches of the Middle
Fork of Buffalo Creek, creating a dam that held back a lake of grimy water
left over from coal washing.11 John Kebblish—second-in-command at Pittston Coal, the parent company of Buffalo Creek—knew that steady rains
threatened to overtop the dam.12 Kebblish later testified that he had urged
the company to build an emergency spillway, but he ordered no evacuation.
6 See generally Sonia I. Seneviratne et al., Changes in Climate Extremes and Their Impacts
on the Natural Physical Environment, in MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: SPECIAL REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 109 (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., 2012), https://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srex/SREX_Full_Report.pdf.
7 Perhaps with very good reason: As Ryan Keller notes, any attempt to precisely define
and “systematize” a legal concept of disaster might have the unintended consequence of
dampening affective reactions to suffering that help motivate prosocial responsive behavior. See Ryan S. Keller, Keeping Disaster Human: Empathy, Systematization, and the Law, 17
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1 (2016).
8 Daniel Farber, Symposium Introduction: Navigating the Intersection of Environmental Law
and Disaster Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1783, 1787.
9 DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 3 (2d ed. 2009).
10 RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 6 (2004).
11 Robert L. Rabin, Dealing with Disasters: Some Thoughts on the Adequacy of the Legal System, 30 STAN. L. REV. 281, 284 (1978).
12 GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER: THE STORY OF THE SURVIVORS’
UNPRECEDENTED LAWSUIT 147 (1976).
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Here are the facts. When the dam collapsed, it released over 130 million
gallons of wastewater and refuse, sending a 30-foot wall of water down on the
coal towns below. The thick slurry of foul water and waste raced through the
hollow, ripping out homes and bridges. In a matter of hours, 125 people
were killed and over 4000 left homeless. One survivor described the scene:
I cannot explain that water as being water. It looked like a black ocean
where the ground had opened up and it was coming in big waves and it was
coming in a rolling position. If you had thrown a milk carton out in the
river—that’s the way the homes went out, like they were nothing. The water
seemed like the demon itself. It came, destroyed, and left.13

Whole villages were wiped out, replaced that summer by federal government trailers. The trailers were welcome relief, but they could not restore
the valley’s social integrity: “The old communities . . . were utterly destroyed
and never rebuilt; residents began to live a more barren, less communitycentered life.”14 As one victim put it, “we feel like we’re in a strange land
even though it’s just a few miles up Buffalo Creek from where we were.”15
The experience of the villagers at Buffalo Creek suggests a different theory of catastrophe. Catastrophe is not some set of physical circumstances,
but rather disruption of normative order.16 The concepts of catastrophe and
revolution are linked in intellectual history: both portend either “an ultimate
end or a radically new beginning.”17 Robert Cover observed that law constitutes and situates itself within a nomos—“a world of right and wrong, of lawful
and unlawful, of valid and void.”18 Catastrophe blows up the nomos. “Catastrophes,” Linda Ross Meyer explains, “overturn our very faith in justice, plow
up the ground itself. Catastrophes look like cosmic betrayals, not calculated
risks. Catastrophes, whether local or international, are moments when we
confront the limits of our normative world.”19
Catastrophic events, it seems, threaten to hurl us back into the state of
nature. The “state of nature” is a foundational concept in political theory
13

KAI T. ERIKSON, EVERYTHING IN ITS PATH: DESTRUCTION OF COMMUNITY IN THE BUFCREEK FLOOD 30 (1976).
14 Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 488
(1994).
15 STERN, supra note 12, at 53. For an extraordinary multimedia retrospective on a
coal ash disaster that had similarly devastating effects on a town in Britain, see Ceri Jackson, Aberfan: The Mistake that Cost a Village Its Children, BBC (Oct. 21, 2016), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-150d11df-c541-44a9-9332-560a19828c47.
16 Some would go further to argue that the distinctive impact of catastrophe lies not
merely in disrupting normative order, but in “overturning the very belief in normative
order.” Lawrence Douglas et al., A Jurisprudence of Catastrophe: An Introduction, in LAW AND
CATASTROPHE 1, 2 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007).
17 Alyssa Battistoni, Kata and/or Streiphen?: Climate Change and the Politics of Catastrophe, in CATASTROPHES: A HISTORY AND THEORY OF AN OPERATIVE CONCEPT 156, 166 (Nitzan
Lebovic & Andreas Killen eds., 2014).
18 Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983).
19 Linda Ross Meyer, Catastrophe: Plowing Up the Ground of Reason, in LAW AND CATASTROPHE, supra note 16, at 20.
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which we do not aim to treat here. In the familiar debate, a Hobbesian “war
of all against all”20 contrasts with John Locke’s vision of harmony governed
by reason.21 What is striking for our purposes is that this debate recurs in the
aftermath of contemporary catastrophes. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina,
for instance, the popular press and even public officials described New Orleans as a war zone, engulfed by “widespread chaos, anarchy, and violent crime
directed at both rescuers and other survivors.”22 Various commentators have
pushed back against these Hobbesian accounts, arguing that solidarity, not
strife, characterized post-Katrina New Orleans.23 We accept the more optimistic rendering but the germane point is that both accounts implicitly
accept Meyer’s conception of catastrophe as a moment of normative
overturning.
Note, though, that even under the pessimist’s view the overturning does
not precipitate the original state of nature. We cannot return to the prepolitical condition imagined by Locke and, to a lesser extent, Hobbes.24 Instead,
disaster creates a “second state of nature”: normal legal order and governmental function are suspended, but only temporarily.25 We expect the
incumbent political apparatus to respond and reimpose “order.” At first, this
response might take the form of dramatic assertions of executive power.
After Katrina, elected officials, citing “mass chaos,” declared their intention
to “restore law and order.”26 Police and National Guard troops imposed a
state of de facto martial law.27 In these initial stages, catastrophe may resemble Carl Schmitt’s state of exception.28 Schmitt’s writings have come to stand
20 THOMAS HOBBES, ON THE CITIZEN ch. I, ¶ 13, at 30 (Richard Tuck ed., Michael
Silverthorne trans., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998) (1642) (emphasis omitted).
21 See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 6–7 (Richard H. Cox ed.,
Harlan Davidson, 1982) (1689).
22 Lisa Grow Sun & RonNell Andersen Jones, Disaggregating Disasters, 60 UCLA L. REV.
884, 916 (2013).
23 See, e.g., REBECCA SOLNIT, A PARADISE BUILT IN HELL: THE EXTRAORDINARY COMMUNITIES THAT ARISE IN DISASTER 235 (2009) (“New Orleans had long been a high-crime city,
but the mythic city of monsters the media and authorities invented in the wake of Katrina
never existed, except in their imagination.”); Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law,
96 CORNELL L. REV. 1131, 1137 (2011) (“[I]n the aftermath of natural disasters, most people engage in prosocial, helping behaviors; antisocial behavior is the exception, rather
than the rule.”).
24 See Douglas et al., supra note 16, at 4 (arguing that Hobbes, unlike Locke, saw the
state of nature as an “analytic” rather than a “historical” condition: “It is the state that
societies always threaten to revert back to, given the right set of conditions”).
25 See NAOMI ZACK, ETHICS FOR DISASTER 74–78 (2009).
26 John Esterbrook, New Orleans Fights to Stop Looting, CBS NEWS (Aug. 31, 2005), http:/
/www.cbsnews.com/news/new-orleans-fights-to-stop-looting.
27 See Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The Constitution After
Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 143 (2006) (“After the floodwaters receded, police
officers, federal agents, and troops patrolled the city and settled into a posture of
undeclared martial law.”).
28 See generally CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT
OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., MIT Press, 1985) (1922).
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for the proposition that the exception discredits any attempt to subject sovereign prerogative to the rule of law.29 Following Schmitt, much scholarly discussion of states of emergencies has focused on executive power and its
proper constraint.
These questions are not the primary focus of this Article. Assuming that
a bare level of physical security can be restored, a broader array of legal
actors must confront lasting damage to normative order. As one of Schmitt’s
contemporary interpreters has observed, even great ruptures do not fully
uproot entrenched norms: “The suspension of the norm does not mean its
abolition, and the zone of anomie that it establishes is not (or at least claims
not to be) unrelated to the juridical order.”30 Catastrophes, rather, create
situations of misalignment, where a void opens between normative structure
and cognizable fact.
Judges, more so than police, can reassert jurisdiction to close this gap.
The political theorist Bonnie Honig explains how Schmitt’s preoccupation
with the sovereign exception obscures this important task. “[T]he current
focus on the question of what we are legitimately allowed to do in response to
emergency,” she argues, “tends to focus attention on the moment of emergency and not on the afterlife of survival.”31 When catastrophe strikes, and
the nomos is rent asunder, we must restore not only bare order but also normative integrity: “The goal is to salvage from the wreckage of the situation
enough narrative unity for the self to go on.”32 Since judges speak in terms
of reason and not only of power, they have a unique role to play in this
reconstruction.
What forms should their role take? Most concretely, courts provide a
mechanism by which the victims of catastrophe may employ state power
against people and institutions responsible for rupture. Courts can order
monetary and injunctive relief, or at the very least declare rights and facilitate
out-of-court settlements. But law pushes back against catastrophe in other
less tangible ways as well. Law is expressive: it constructs narratives that
attach moral significance to otherwise meaningless, stochastic events. After
Hurricane Katrina, the law turned a man breaking a window into a looter,
and an entire city into a ward of the federal government. As Cover argued:
“There is a difference between sleeping late on Sunday and refusing the sacraments, between having a snack and desecrating the fast of Yom Kippur,
between banking a check and refusing to pay your income tax.”33 Legal narrative, in other words, imbues bare facts with social and cultural significance.

29 For a summary of Schmitt’s views—and their possible caricature in legal academic
discourse—see Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1095, 1098–1101 (2009).
30 GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION § 1.8, at 23 (Kevin Attell trans., 2005).
31 BONNIE HONIG, EMERGENCY POLITICS: PARADOX, LAW, DEMOCRACY 9 (2009).
32 Id. at 5.
33 Cover, supra note 18, at 8 (footnotes omitted).
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As we will discuss below, litigation—and tort litigation in particular—plays a
distinct role in developing and sustaining such narratives.34
Meyer characterizes these responses—risk management, narrative
reframing, and others—as a collective denial of the power of catastrophe:
“Law is constantly colonizing catastrophe, reframing it as injustice,
expanding the bounds and jurisdiction of law, and consequently expanding
the zone of human control and responsibility.”35 For Meyer, denial does not
connote surrender. The denialist judge does seek to redress the harms of
catastrophe, but she downplays its aberrant quality: “We deny that the event
is a challenge to our normative structures, and we reframe it as injustice, not
catastrophe.”36 Tort scholars might think of the first famous Second Circuit
opinion (Kinsman I) addressing the aftermath of a calamitous flood along
the Buffalo River in 1959.37 Although the consequences were extraordinary
and the range of contributing factors—from acts of God to careless seamanship to drunken dereliction of duty—vast, the court nevertheless worked
mightily to “domesticate” the case and apportion responsibility among identified parties as if the dispute were an ordinary multiparty tort case.38
Meyer adopts an ambivalent stance toward denial. Even though we
might prefer to see harm redressed, the exercise of brute power to “colonize
catastrophe” effaces the event’s generative potential. This ambivalence
toward judicial action was also at the center of Cover’s work. “[T]here is a
radical dichotomy,” he argued, “between the social organization of law as
power and the organization of law as meaning.”39 At the moment of decision, the judge approves an official norm and thus suppresses other, disfavored narratives. As a result, “[i]nterpretation always takes place in the
shadow of coercion,”40 or, more dramatically, “[l]egal interpretation takes
place in a field of pain and death.”41
Yet inaction can inflict a symmetric violence. Meyer articulates an alternative response to catastrophe: nihilism. Rather than expand the bounds of
law to domesticate disaster, “[t]he nihilist acknowledges the normative challenge that the catastrophe represents and stays there. The normative ground
is gone, anomie reigns,” and “[a]ll that remains are the subjective claims of
34 See infra Sections II.A, III.B.
35 Meyer, supra note 19, at 21.
36 Id.
37 In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964).
38 Most notably, the court’s critical doctrinal conclusion is supported not by an affirmative argument, but by the purported absence of a counterargument. See id. at 725 (“We
see no reason why an actor engaging in conduct which entails a large risk of small damage
and a small risk of other and greater damage, of the same general sort, from the same
forces, and to the same class of persons, should be relieved of responsibility for the latter
simply because the chance of its occurrence, if viewed alone, may not have been large
enough to require the exercise of care.”).
39 Cover, supra note 18, at 18.
40 Id. at 40.
41 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
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individual voices.”42 The nihilist does not try to reconstruct the normative
order unsettled by catastrophe. For the nihilist, the redress of harms will
depend on power, not principle. Again, tort scholars might think of the
“unusual concatenation of events on the Buffalo River during the night of
January 21, 1959,” and the unsatisfactory way in which a second class of claimants were waved away as having “too tenuous and remote” of a connection to
the defendants’ negligence to recover (Kinsman II).43 Below, in Part II, we
will show that nihilism, though it may sound foreign and dystopian, accurately describes a standard response of tort law to catastrophe.
We can apply Meyer’s framework to the example of the Buffalo Creek
Disaster. For the victims of the flood, the usual forms of communal meaning
ceased to cohere. They suffered a “blow to the basic tissues of social life that
damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing
sense of communality.”44 In Meyer’s terms, they confronted the overturning
of their normative universe. And for most of them, tort law never provided
an adequate response. Pittston Coal immediately and loudly maintained that
the disaster had been an “act of God,” to which no liability could attach.45
Pittston, in other words, espoused the nihilist view of catastrophe: it self-interestedly asserted that this disaster’s meaning exceeded the power of law.
And indeed, Pittston’s insurers successfully settled with most of the
injured before the lawyers even arrived, perhaps aided by their loud protestations (or threats) of innocence.46 Gerald Stern, a white-shoe attorney called
in by the Environmental Defense Fund, ended up recruiting only 625 of the
4000 survivors as plaintiffs. Moreover, the majority of these plaintiffs had not
sustained physical injury, or even significant property damage.47 Instead,
their principal injuries were emotional. They suffered from continual anxiety and guilt, what we might today describe as post-traumatic stress disorder.
One remark of the plaintiff psychiatrist is particularly apt:
In many disasters survivors are able to find some comfort, or at least resignation, in the deep conviction that what happened was a matter of God’s will
or of some larger power that no mortal could influence. But this disaster
was man-made, and such survivors can find no reason or justification for it.
Their suffering seems unresolvable.48

The Buffalo Creek Disaster was an injustice, not a misfortune. It demanded a
legal response to reorder a shattered nomos.
Unfortunately, tort law was ill-equipped to mount such a response.
Common-law courts have generally looked on claims of psychological harm
with skepticism, adopting “a variety of liability-limiting approaches” to short42 Meyer, supra note 19, at 22.
43 In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1968).
44 ERIKSON, supra note 13, at 154; see also STERN, supra note 12, at 235.
45 STERN, supra note 12, at 11.
46 See id. at 22.
47 Many of the plaintiffs were children who did not own property. Id. at 66.
48 Id. at 114.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL107.txt

2017]

unknown

courting disaster

Seq: 9

9-NOV-17

13:29

303

circuit the normal application of “liability based on foreseeability.”49 Acting
without much favorable precedent to guide him, Stern claimed $50,000 in
emotional damages for each of his named plaintiffs. In total, the original
complaint alleged $52 million in damages against the coal operator. After
more than two years of pretrial discovery and procedural jockeying, the
defendants settled for $13.5 million, or about $13,000 per plaintiff.50 That
sum—though not trivial—surely does not comprehend the full significance
of the disaster, which wiped out entire communities forever. The settlement
provided some redress, but it did not create precedent to upend tort law’s
literalist and naı̈ve understanding of foreseeability or its implicit hierarchy of
interests which deprivileges emotional, relational, and communal security.
In Meyer’s terms, the settlement represented a denialist response to
catastrophe.
The example of the Buffalo Creek Disaster demonstrates that denial and
nihilism share a basic commitment to the normative status quo. The plaintiff’s attorney understandably prefers the court to deny catastrophe’s
power—rather than just surrender to it—but in neither case does the court
truly interrogate prevailing norms. The denialist judge responds reflexively
to disaster, attempting to assimilate it within ordinary legal frames.51 The
nihilist judge, on the other hand, vacates the field in a single case seemingly
to protect the system as a whole. In the constitutional context, one commentator sympathetically argues, “recognizing a separate reality of extralegal
activity in the face of emergency may help in maintaining the integrity of the
ordinary legal system.”52 President Lincoln, defending his unilateral suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, famously asked, “are all the laws, but one, to
go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”53 On this view, nihilism can also be seen as a fundamentally conservative stance toward catastrophe.
Still, how long can such a conservative approach hold up under a barrage of catastrophic harms? Eventually, legal doctrine and normative structure must evolve to restore order in a world of catastrophic overturning. A
major purpose of this Article will be to argue that courts must accept their
essential role in that evolution. But first, we need to understand just how
much is at stake in that endeavor. And so we turn to climate change.
49 JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 317 (8th ed. 2012). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM ch. 8 Scope Note (AM. LAW INST.
2012) (“Historically, courts were quite restrictive and cautious about permitting recovery
for pure emotional harm.”).
50 STERN, supra note 12, at 301.
51 See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text.
52 Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1132 (2003).
53 President Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861),
in BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, EX PARTE MERRYMAN AND DEBATES ON CIVIL LIBERTIES DURING THE
CIVIL WAR 38 (2007), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/trials/merryman.pdf.
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B. Climate Chaos
It is now beyond serious dispute that anthropogenic climate change
threatens humanity and other life forms with massive harm. The peril of
climate change has been described as “one of the central public policy issues
of our time,”54 as “one of the key challenges of our lifetimes and future generations,”55 and even as “the gravest crisis in human history.”56 Other commentators, of a more millenarian tendency, write “a requiem for a species”57
and warn of the “last chance to save humanity.”58 Somewhere in the middle
of this alarmed spectrum, Richard Lazarus characterizes climate change as a
“super wicked problem” that “defies resolution because of the enormous
interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities, and conflicting stakeholders
implicated by any effort to develop a solution.”59
Lazarus’s description sounds in the theory of complex systems, an area
of study that applies mathematical insights to ecological, social, and other
dynamical processes.60 Complex systems consist of many interconnected
parts whose interactions, in the aggregate, do not conform to standard
assumptions of linear behavior. Importantly, “simple, deterministic rules”
might govern each individual causal moment.61 But the system as a whole
nevertheless exhibits “surprise phenomena produced by chaos, emergence,
and catastrophe.”62 Complexity undermines a central tenet of reductionist
science, namely, that studying constituent parts will reveal general properties.63 No matter how powerful our computers, no matter how precise our
instruments, our understanding will remain partial.64
Many scholars have observed the troubling implications of chaos and
complexity theory for environmental law and policymaking.65 For linear sys54 David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A
New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15, 17 (2012).
55 President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Announcing the Clean
Power Plan (Aug. 3, 2015), http://go.wh.gov/4KvDkq.
56 Bill McKibben, Introduction, in THE GLOBAL WARMING READER: A CENTURY OF WRITING ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (Bill McKibben ed., 2011).
57 See CLIVE HAMILTON, REQUIEM FOR A SPECIES: WHY WE RESIST THE TRUTH ABOUT
CLIMATE CHANGE (2010).
58 JAMES HANSEN, STORMS OF MY GRANDCHILDREN: THE TRUTH ABOUT THE COMING CLIMATE CATASTROPHE AND OUR LAST CHANCE TO SAVE HUMANITY, at iv (2009).
59 Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009).
60 See generally J.M. Ottino, Complex Systems, 49 AICHE J. 292 (2003) (providing an overview of early developments in the field and discussing their relevance to several problems
in chemical engineering).
61 J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A
Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849, 860
(1996).
62 Id.
63 See Ottino, supra note 60, at 293.
64 See generally 1 Corinthians 13:8–10.
65 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 147 (2003); Ruhl, supra note 61, at 855.
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tems, where margins of error remain stable over time, we can control for
gaps in our knowledge. Using standard statistical techniques, we can “transform situations of ignorance and uncertainty into situations of risk.”66 This
ability to predict—at least approximately—the future is essential to risk-utility
approaches in both regulation and common law adjudication. Yet for complex adaptive systems, risk-utility analyses of the usual sort may be seen as
fundamentally ill-suited for the nature of the decision making problems at
hand:
Because complex adaptive systems contain ineliminable uncertainties that
cannot be presumed to be of minor importance, such systems by their
nature are likely to present ill-posed problems, that is, problems whose
imperviousness to resolution is driven not by deficiencies in our epistemic
position, but rather by features inherent to the problems themselves.67

The Buffalo Creek Disaster is illustrative. Robert Rabin observes that,
before the disaster, administrative officials had “completely ignored the possibility of such massive harm.”68 They had examined previous collapses
resulting in relatively minor property damage and had assumed a world of
stability, linearity, predictability. They ignored the disjunction between our
learning and our experience. The standard tools of risk assessment, devised
originally for tightly controlled human environments like laboratories and
factories, apply imperfectly in other settings. Most of our lives are not spent
in casinos.
Not only the climate system, but also the social systems acting upon it are
dynamic and reactive. Most troubling is the possibility of “tipping points” in
these systems. We now face real but uncertain likelihoods of “abrupt climate
change,” in which “the climate system is forced to cross some threshold, triggering a transition to a new state at a rate . . . faster than the cause.”69 Scientists have identified a number of mechanisms by which global warming could
lead to these sudden, nonlinear shifts in the Earth system.70 Among the
most alarming contenders are the collapse of the Greenland and West Antarctica ice sheets, the halt of the Gulf Stream due to changes in ocean salinity, and the massive dieback of tropical rainforests due to shifting rainfall
patterns.71 Shortly after the U.S. presidential election of 2016, a report in
Nature documented the results of a multicountry experimental assessment of
the possibility for soils to become net releasers of greenhouse gases. As temperatures warm, soils increasingly release greenhouse gases that might otherwise remain stably secured underground. The study found that soil
66 DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE
SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 72 (2010).
67 Id. at 74.
68 Rabin, supra note 11, at 287.
69 COMM. ON ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE, ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE: INEVITABLE SURPRISES
14 (2002).
70 For a summary of possible scenarios, see Timothy M. Lenton et al., Tipping Elements
in the Earth’s Climate System, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1786, 1786 (2008).
71 Id.
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decomposition appears poised by midcentury to add a source of greenhouse
gas emissions equivalent in scope to the entire U.S. economy.72 In other
words, just as the global political community feared it had lost the United
States from international climate cooperation, scientists identified a second
U.S.-sized threat lurking beneath the ground with only the laws of physics to
govern its demands.
These catastrophic climate-change scenarios have become the stuff of
frequent academic speculation and even Hollywood dramatization. We will
not delve into further detail here, except to identify a few ways in which these
scenarios shed light on catastrophe more generally. First, they are irreversible on any conceivable human timescale. Complex systems often possess
multiple equilibria, such that a sufficiently large perturbation can cause a
durable shift in the system’s state.73 This phenomenon provides an especially powerful example of path-dependency: today’s political failures may
foreclose possible natural worlds. Second, catastrophes frequently involve
positive feedback loops. One oft-cited example is the melting of Arctic sea
ice, which exposes the comparatively darker and heat-absorbing ocean water,
accelerating in turn the pace of global warming. Many scientists believe that
this system exhibits “strong nonlinearity” and “may already have passed a tipping point.”74 The winter of 2016, in which Arctic sea ice decline and abnormally warm temperatures reached levels that caused palpable shock among
scientists,75 has been taken by some experts to represent the first clear signs
of earth system processes beginning to tip.
Finally, as noted above, we have no present means of assigning usable
probabilities to the occurrence of such events. Granted, climate experts have
sought to provide some guidance. A metastudy canvassed the opinions of
leading climatologists and concluded that, even under conservative assumptions, there is at least a sixteen percent chance of one or more “triggering”
events occurring before the end of this century under a two to four degrees
Celsius warming scenario.76 This estimation is not alarmism. We know from
paleo-climate studies that nonlinear shifts have happened before under conditions like those we have created.77 But scientific inquiry runs up against
epistemic barriers when confronting super wicked problems. Increased
knowledge of complex dynamics may paradoxically increase the margins of
72 See T.W. Crowther et al., Quantifying Global Soil Carbon Losses in Response to Warming,
540 NATURE 104, 107 (2016).
73 COMM. ON ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 69, at 94.
74 Lenton, supra note 70, at 1788.
75 Chris Mooney, 2016’s Super Warm Arctic Winter ‘Extremely Unlikely’ Without Climate
Change, Scientists Say, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2016/12/28/2016s-super-warm-arctic-winter-extremelyunlikely-without-climate-change-scientists-say/?utm_term=.497ca7decbd2.
76 Elmar Kriegler et al., Imprecise Probability Assessment of Tipping Points in the Climate
System, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5041, 5041 (2009).
77 See Lenton, supra note 70, at 1787.
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uncertainty,78 an intellectual insight that provides profoundly frustrating guidance for policymakers.
In light of the foregoing, the precise likelihood of any particular climate
catastrophe remains “difficult, if not impossible, to estimate.”79 A fundamental lesson of chaos and complexity theory is that uncertainty does not imply
low probability despite our cognitive tendency to associate the two. Instead,
many dynamical systems are best modeled by “fat tail” probability distributions, where the most likely outcome is mild but in which catastrophic outcomes remain disturbingly possible.80 Our ongoing experiment with global
climate change draws us farther and farther into a realm of foreseeable
unforeseeability, of routine but unpredictable catastrophe. This scientific
fact has ethical consequences: since “[c]atastrophe is what we didn’t expect
and couldn’t predict,” we learn to “see ourselves as unable to control the
world.”81 The turn to nihilism then seems almost compelled.
C. Time Is Late and the Water Rises
Tipping points give urgency to the project of this Article, but the disruptive power of chaos, complexity, and climate change is also evident in less
extreme circumstances. In much of the remainder of this Article, we will
focus on floods, as flooding has provoked much of the actual climate change
litigation to date. Rising seas and more powerful storms threaten communities around the world. As will be discussed in the remainder of this Introduction, potential harms range from the repeat of past disasters—such as
Hurricane Katrina or the 2010 Pakistan Floods—to dramatic but unrealized
perils—such as the failure of the Mississippi Old River Control Structure or
the inundation of the Sacramento Bay Delta.
The devastation of Hurricane Katrina awoke the American public to the
hazards of climate change disasters.82 The sheer scale of the tragedy—
around 1500 victims and over $22 billion in property damage83—brought
renewed attention to the issues of disaster response and climate change. And
climate change did aggravate the damage caused by Katrina, although more
78 Eric Rignot, Changes in the Greenland Ice Sheet and Implications for Global Sea Level Rise,
in SUDDEN AND DISRUPTIVE CLIMATE CHANGE: EXPLORING THE REAL RISKS AND HOW WE CAN
AVOID THEM 63, 73 (Michael C. MacCracken et al. eds., 2008) (“In the last ten years, the
margins of uncertainty in predicting ice sheet evolution have grown larger rather than
smaller.”).
79 KYSAR, supra note 66, at 94.
80 Farber, supra note 65, at 155.
81 Meyer, supra note 19, at 22.
82 In 2007, almost three-quarters of Americans believed that “there will be more and
stronger hurricanes in a warming world.” Cornelia Dean, Will Warming Lead to a Rise in
Hurricanes?, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/science/
earth/29hurr.html.
83 Daniel A. Farber, Tort Law in the Era of Climate Change, Katrina, and 9/11: Exploring
Liability for Extraordinary Risks, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1075, 1075 (2009).
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likely by sea level rise than by increased storm power.84 But the true lesson of
Katrina is that catastrophe results from a complex, dynamic interaction of
natural and constructed causes.
It is now a truism that Katrina was, in a deep sense, a “man-made disaster.”85 The Army Corps of Engineers was negligent in its construction and
maintenance of the levee system.86 Moreover, human engineering of the
Mississippi River delta system has contributed to coastal erosion and wetland
destruction on an unprecedented scale. Before human intervention, the Mississippi wandered back and forth across the northern Gulf Coast, depositing
sediment across a vast delta of marshes, floodplain forests, and barrier
islands. Today’s river, channeled and funneled by dikes, levees, and canals,
deposits most of its two-hundred-million annual tons of sediment into the
deep ocean.87 As a result, the Louisiana coast every year loses “an area of
wetlands close to the size of Manhattan.”88
The expansion of the delta over the past 7000 years depended on a low
rate of sea level rise, which allowed sediment deposition to outpace coastal
erosion.89 Anthropogenic climate change runs this process in reverse: rising
sea levels shift delta deposition landward. Erosion, combined with accelerated subsidence due to fossil fuel extraction, rapidly eats away at the shoreline.90 In the middle of this vast geologic process sits a city, the Big Easy,
protected by some thin concrete walls. We recite these facts not to absolve
the Army Corps of Engineers of its negligent acts, but rather to demonstrate
that “[i]n a world of complexity and interconnection, any single event will be
traceable to innumerable but-for causes that led to the event’s occurrence.”91
Climate change undermines not only our physical infrastructure but also our
ability to configure causal relationships in our minds.
84 See Ning Lin et al., Physically Based Assessment of Hurricane Surge Threat Under Climate
Change, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 462, 462 (2012).
85 John McQuaid et al., Evidence Points to Man-made Disaster, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 8,
2005, at A1.
86 For a detailed description of the failure of the 17th Street Canal levee, see Farber,
supra note 83, at 1088 n.36.
87 JOHN MCPHEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURE 5 (1990).
88 Carolyn Kousky & Richard Zeckhauser, JARring Actions that Fuel the Floods, in ON
RISK AND DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA 60 (Ronald J. Daniels et al. eds.,
2006).
89 Virginia Burkett, The Northern Gulf of Mexico Coast: Human Development Patterns,
Declining Ecosystems and Escalating Vulnerability to Storms and Sea Level Rise, in SUDDEN AND
DISRUPTIVE CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 78, at 102.
90 Id. at 109; see also Chelsea Harvey, Scientists Say the Rapid Sinking of Louisiana’s Coast
Already Counts as a ‘Worst Case Scenario’, WASH. POST (June 15, 2017), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/06/15/scientists-say-the-rapid-sink
ing-of-louisianas-coast-already-counts-as-a-worst-case-scenario/?utm_term=.893588aafea0
(describing results of new methods of geological research that measured Louisiana coastal
subsidence).
91 Douglas A. Kysar & Thomas O. McGarity, Did NEPA Drown New Orleans? The Levees,
the Blame Game, and the Hazards of Hindsight, 56 DUKE L.J. 179, 209 (2006).
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The greatest threat to the cities of southern Louisiana is not a hurricane,
but the same natural process that made Louisiana’s lands in the first place.
145 miles northwest of New Orleans, near Simmesport, the Mississippi splits
in two. About thirty percent of the river’s flow thunders down through a
series of dams and locks into the Atchafalaya River below.92 From there, the
Atchafalaya flows to Morgan City on the Gulf of Mexico by a course 150 miles
shorter than the ponderous path of the Mississippi.93 The Army Corps of
Engineers recognized in the early twentieth century that only drastic action
could prevent the capture of the Mississippi by Atchafalaya, which would
drown Morgan City and leave the industrial centers to the south dry. In an
awesome act of either courage or hubris, the Corps constructed a huge complex, now known as the Old River Control Structure, to hold back America’s
largest river and prevent it from shifting course to join the Atchafalaya.94
The Corps, in other words, is striving to hold in stasis a complex and
dynamic system. That effort will ultimately fail, but we cannot predict when
with any certainty. There have already been close calls. A 1973 flood almost
destroyed Old River Control by scouring out its foundations. The Corps was
forced to open the Morganza Spillway, flooding large swaths of low country
to ease the pressure downstream. A 2011 flood set a new record for the flood
stage at Old River Control—over five feet higher than the 1973 crest—and
again compelled the Corps to open the spillway.95 The latent instability of
the system increases each year, as the Atchafalaya continues to erode its own
bed even as the Mississippi slowly rises with new sediment deposition.96
The economic and human consequences of Old River Control’s failure
would be massive. Although we are unaware of any systematic effort to estimate the costs, the course shift would inundate thousands of homes and
leave stranded one of the largest industrial agglomerations in North
America. Preventing this catastrophe will require “increasingly heroic
efforts” just to provide “a given level of protection.”97 John McPhee quotes a
geologist who states ominously, “[n]ineteen-seventy-three was a forty-year
flood. The big one lies out there somewhere . . . .”98 We cannot be sure
when that “big one” will arrive—but we know that it grows more likely as the
92

Kenneth R. Foster & Robert Giegengack, Planning for a City on the Brink, in ON RISK
DISASTER: LESSONS FROM HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 88, at 45.
93 Id.
94 In Canada’s Yukon, a successful process of “river piracy”—in which one river diverts
and captures another river’s flow—was observed in a geological instant when rapidly melting and thinning glaciers enabled river flows to switch from a northward to a southward
direction over the course of just a few days. See Daniel H. Shugar et al., River Piracy and
Drainage Basin Reorganization Led by Climate-Driven Glacier Retreat, 10 NATURE GEOSCIENCE
370 (2017).
95 See Jeff Masters, America’s Achilles’ Heel: The Mississippi River’s Old River Control Structure, WUNDERBLOG (May 13, 2011, 5:20 PM), https://www.wunderground.com/blog/
JeffMasters/americas-achilles-heel-the-mississippi-rivers-old-river-control-st.html.
96 Foster & Giegengack, supra note 92.
97 Id. at 49.
98 MCPHEE, supra note 87, at 54.
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world grows hotter.99 It will be only marginally more powerful than the
floods of 1973 or 2011, but it will produce nonlinear, catastrophic consequences. Atchafalaya forces us to question yet again “whether the classical
scientific assumption of normal distributions and predictable, linear biophysical behavior is appropriate in a world of complexity and climate change.”100
The Mississippi River is by no means unique. Rising seas and strengthening storms threaten all of the world’s great river deltas and the civilizations
they support. Here in the United States, another potential catastrophe
looms over the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. In California’s Central Valley,
each year’s snowmelt would once bring annual flooding to the Sacramento
Delta, creating a vast, seasonal inland sea. Early settlers, and later the Army
Corps of Engineers, responded as one would expect: they built a complex
system of levees to create a “carefully drained and cultivated garden, carrying
on its face a populous network of protected farms and towns.”101 The situation in California is, if anything, less stable than that in Louisiana. In addition to the inexorable sea level rise and the increasing frequency of extreme
floods,102 the Sacramento’s levees lie on a seismic fault. A major earthquake
could cause simultaneous failures of multiple levee systems.103 And the damage would extend well beyond the local communities: the cities of southern
California rely on water exports from the Delta to meet their everyday needs.
The same issues of complexity and catastrophe haunt Pakistan and the
Netherlands. In addition to their great historical and cultural significance,
the Indus Valley and the Rhine-Meuse Delta have been at the center of major
climate change litigation in recent years. We take up those lawsuits in Part
III. For now, it suffices to set the stage for future discussion. In July and
August of 2010, a series of torrential storms caused the worst flooding of the
Indus Valley in at least a century. The scale of the damage was staggering:
1700 lives lost, 20 million people left homeless, and at least $40 billion in
economic costs, or nearly a quarter of Pakistan’s gross domestic product at
the time.104 As with Hurricane Katrina in the United States, this catastrophe
provoked a national debate in Pakistan about the threat of climate change.
The government responded in 2012 with a National Climate Change Policy,
99 See, e.g., P.C.D. Milly et al., Increasing Risk of Great Floods in a Changing Climate, 415
NATURE 514 (2002) (“[T]he frequency of great floods increased substantially during the
twentieth century.”). Predictions of the precise consequences for the Mississippi River
basin are uncertain, however. See J. Rolf Olsen, Climate Change and Floodplain Management
in the United States, 76 CLIMATIC CHANGE 407, 413 (2006).
100 Kysar & McGarity, supra note 91, at 221.
101 ROBERT KELLEY, BATTLING THE INLAND SEA: AMERICAN POLITICAL CULTURE, PUBLIC
POLICY, AND THE SACRAMENTO VALLEY, 1850–1986, at xvi (1989).
102 See Tapash Dash et al., Potential Increase in Floods in California’s Sierra Nevada Under
Future Climate Projections, 109 CLIMATIC CHANGE S71 (2011).
103 See JAY LUND ET AL., COMPARING FUTURES FOR THE SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA,
at iv–v (2008).
104 William K.M. Lau & Kyu-Myong Kim, The 2010 Pakistan Flood and Russian Heat Wave:
Teleconnection of Hydrometeorological Extremes, 13 J. HYDROMETEOROLOGY 392, 392 (2012).
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which explicitly warns of “[c]limate [c]hange disasters striking Pakistan with
unthinkable ferocity and unimaginable frequency.”105
Our final example comes from the Netherlands, perhaps the world
leader in flood control and prevention. The Dutch government draws frequent praise for its commitment to flood management,106 born of necessity
in a nation where a quarter of the land lies below sea level.107 And indeed,
the Dutch do set a high standard, designing their flood-control systems “to
limit the occurrence of floods to 1 in 10,000 years.”108 This system, dubbed
the “Deltaplan,” was constructed in the decades following a catastrophic
flood in 1953 from the North Sea in which two thousand people died and
eight percent of the country was submerged.109 No major flooding event has
occurred since that time, but the Dutch situation remains perilous. The
Maeslantkering, a massive storm surge barrier built to protect the port of
Rotterdam, was designed to withstand a sea-level rise of fifty centimeters.
Current estimates of sea-level rise, though vexed by uncertainty, are not comforting: scientists predict a minimum range of 1.7 to 2.4 feet by the end of the
century.110 Who among the nations can hold back the rising tide?
As the preceding discussion has shown, climate change threatens to routinize catastrophe. Global warming may push past one or more planetary
tipping points, fundamentally altering civilizations as we know them. Even if
we stave off such horrors, the same potential for nonlinear emergence threat105 MINISTRY OF CLIMATE CHANGE, NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY, at ii (2012),
http://center-hre.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Pakistan-Naitonal-Climate-ChangePolicy.pdf. The science appears to support the government’s conclusions that global
warming played some role. The rains of July 2010 represented an anomalous shift of the
South Asian monsoon northward. See R.A. Houze, Jr. et al., Anomalous Atmospheric Events
Leading to the Summer 2010 Floods in Pakistan, 92 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 291, 291
(2011). Moreover, that shift was linked to an unusual alteration of the jet stream over
northern Eurasia, which simultaneously precipitated a severe heat wave in Russia. See Lau
& Kim, supra note 104. The jet stream disturbance, in turn, was facilitated by “very high
sea surface temperatures” made more likely by “global warming from human influences.”
Kevin E. Trenberth & John T. Fasullo, Climate Extremes and Climate Change: The Russian Heat
Wave and Other Climate Extremes of 2010, 117 J. GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH D17103 (2012).
106 See, e.g., Andrew Higgins, Lessons for U.S. from a Flood-Prone Land, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/world/europe/netherlands-sets-modelof-flood-prevention.html.
107 See Quirin Schiermeier, Few Fishy Facts Found in Climate Report, 466 NATURE 170, 170
(2010).
108 Foster & Giegengack, supra note 92, at 48.
109 Melanie Schultz van Haegen & Koos Wieriks, The Deltaplan Revisited: Changing Perspectives in the Netherlands’ Flood Risk Reduction Philosophy, 17 WATER POL’Y 41, 44 (2015).
110 Chris Mooney, Scientists Keep Upping Their Projections for How Much the Oceans Will Rise
This Century, WASH. POST (April 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
energy-environment/wp/2017/04/26/scientists-keep-increasing-their-projections-for-howmuch-the-oceans-will-rise-this-century/?utm_term=.8d97d874c30f (reporting on projections by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program of sea level rise this century
depending on emissions pathways and noting that the participating scientists refused to
offer maximum estimates because they “keep uncovering new insights that force them to
increase their sea level estimates further”).
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ens river deltas across the world with catastrophic harms. These catastrophes, in turn, destabilize the normative order established by law. As noted
above, Meyer identifies two paradigmatic responses of law to catastrophe:
denial or nihilism. To deny catastrophe’s power—and to avoid a descent
into nihilism—law must reframe even these biblical floods as human injustices. In the following sections, we consider the ability of tort law to accomplish that reframing.
II. DENIAL

AND

NIHILISM

IN

TORT LAW

In the Anglo-American legal tradition, tort helps to define law’s normative reach. In allowing recovery for some injuries and denying it for others,
tort divides right from wrong and misfortune from injustice. Tort does not
speak with exclusive authority on these questions, of course. Nevertheless,
we argue that tort plays a distinctive role in law’s normative project. Tort
establishes standards of behavior—duties—in a way that makes tort law
generalist, majoritarian, and persistent. It is generalist in the sense that it is
comprehensive: the court must always choose whether to accept or reject a
plaintiff’s plea for relief. As such, tort serves as a residual locus of normative
potential. Even wrongs not yet socially perceived as such may be brought to a
court’s attention and the complaining party will be entitled to a response.
The pronouncements of tort law are majoritarian because tort understands
itself to enforce collective standards of conduct, even if courts are not directly
responsive to electoral results. Finally, the norms of tort are persistent in the
sense that they are more resistant to sudden upheaval than many norms
established by other legal means. These three characteristics, at least in theory, enable tort to confront catastrophe. Tort could respond to any harm, no
matter how extreme, with the voice of the community’s collective and stable,
yet also responsive, authority.
As Meyer suggests, then, tort could organize and sustain law’s denial of
catastrophe, bringing more and more disasters within the bounds of law without honestly confronting the scope and significance of the normative ruptures before it. Indeed, Meyer holds up tort as a paradigmatic example of
how law denies the power of catastrophe, reframing even the “unpredictable
or unexpected” as ordinary injustice that does not call into question the
larger structure of the nomos.111 And Meyer believes that tort is constantly
widening its definition of wrongful conduct to subsume more and more of
experience within its purview: “[L]iability turns on foreseeability, a term that
tends to expand naturally with experience.”112 Advocates for “tort reform”
might agree with Meyer on this point.113 But this Part will argue that tort
more often resorts to Meyer’s second response to catastrophe: nihilism.
111 Meyer, supra note 19, at 21.
112 Id.
113 See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 726 nn.36–41 (1998).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL107.txt

2017]

unknown

courting disaster

Seq: 19

9-NOV-17

13:29

313

When presented with claims of massive harm, common-law courts often
find their way to a judgment for defendants. In recent years, a variety of selflimiting procedural and jurisdictional doctrines have arisen to effectuate this
approach. Even when a court reaches the merits of a disaster lawsuit, it will
often read doctrines narrowly—or ignore them entirely—in order to avoid
an enormous recovery for the plaintiff. This reticence predates the recent
wave of common-law climate change litigation, but climate change plaintiffs
have met with similar frustration in the courts. Catastrophic harms, it seems,
typically must lie where they fall.
This nihilistic response will become increasingly untenable as the effects
of climate change proliferate and intensify. Before we explore how courts
might mount a more vigorous response, however, we will lay out the current
landscape. In this Part we describe tort’s role in establishing communal
norms and explain the ways in which tort has often abdicated that role with
regard to extreme harms.
A. Judging as Usual
The negligence standard is a communal norm. A person behaves negligently when he or she fails to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. In the canonical formulation, from the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
one must act as would “a reasonable man under like circumstances.”114 The
“reasonable man” test has been subject to much criticism, of course. Critical
theorists have argued that, both on its face and in its application, the test fails
to accommodate the perspectives of women, racial minorities, and other disempowered groups.115 The Restatement (Third) attempts to overcome the
feminist critique, at least, by rephrasing the test in gender-neutral terms.116
But such changes cannot dispel the fundamental tension between a uniform
standard and a heterogeneous society. No actual person perfectly fits the
constructed “reasonable person.” The courts use this legal fiction to iron out
individual idiosyncrasies and impose a shared expectation of appropriate
behavior. As Justice Holmes observed, this project is the project of law itself:
“[W]hen men live in society, a certain average of conduct, a sacrifice of individual peculiarities going beyond a certain point, is necessary to the general
welfare.”117
Importantly, the fact that tort imposes a general norm of behavior precedes any theory of the content of that norm. To oversimplify, tort theory
divides broadly into instrumentalist approaches and corrective justice
114 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
115 See, e.g., Leslie Bender & Perette Lawrence, Is Tort Law Male?: Foreseeability Analysis
and Property Managers’ Liability for Third Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313,
313 (1993); Dolores A. Donovan & Stephanie M. Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete?:
A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 437 (1981).
116 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010)
(“A person acts negligently if the person does not exercise reasonable care under all the
circumstances.”).
117 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108 (1881).
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approaches. Corrective justice theorists, for their part, explicitly recognize
the normative aspect of tort law: “[T]he aim is to govern behavior and regulate affairs by specifying norms.”118 Tort liability flows from “the natural duty
people have ‘not to harm or injure others,’ and the natural right people have
not to be harmed or injured.”119
This moralistic view is traditionally contrasted with instrumentalist rationales for tort liability. In Guido Calabresi’s famous account, “the principal
function of accident law is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the
costs of avoiding accidents.”120 Although instrumentalists speak in more sanitized language, they espouse a norm no less comprehensive than that of the
corrective justice theorists. The “Hand formula,” at least in theory, describes
a method of risk-utility analysis by which an informed judge could decide the
scope of duty in every case that comes before him or her.121 In this sense,
wealth maximization and optimal deterrence also aspire to general normative authority.
These examples suggest a broader claim: tort law enunciates general
normative commands. These commands ultimately emerge from the nature
of adjudication itself. As Cover observed, “[a]djudication in the common law
mold entails two simultaneously performed functions: dispute resolution and
norm articulation.”122 Judges must decide every case, but they must also give
reasons for their decisions. The duty of care springs from this particular
union: the “requirement of articulation, together with even a weak consistency requirement, over time, will necessarily entail the articulation of general norms.”123
This theoretical argument finds support in the explicit statements of
common-law courts. Despite the usual prohibition on advisory opinions,
judges often openly announce general principles.124 To take just a few
examples, consider the following statements, all from tort cases within the
past decade: “the Court seeks . . . to maximize consistency and continuity in
118 Jules L. Coleman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1149, 1168 (2008).
119 William H. Rodgers, Jr., Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory,
54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1980) (footnote omitted) (quoting JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 114 (1971)).
120 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26 (1970). For an illuminating instrumentalist tort discussion in the context of disaster, see Michael G. Faure, In the Aftermath of
Disaster: Liability and Compensation Mechanisms as Tools to Reduce Disaster Risks, 52 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 95 (2016).
121 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B
is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [less than] PL.”).
122 Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 643 (1981).
123 Id.; see also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 635 (1995)
(“The act of giving a reason, therefore, is an exercise in generalization. The lawyer or
judge who gives a reason steps behind and beyond the case at hand to something more
encompassing.”).
124 For more on this tension, see id. at 654–56.
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the law while establishing clear guidance for future litigants”;125 “the fundamental goals of the common law [are] fairness to the parties, and stable and
predictable rules of law to guide future cases”;126 “in our negligence law, the
duty determination is better suited for large categories of cases rather than
specific circumstances.”127 A majoritarian legislature exercises raw political
will, arbitrary though putatively democratic. A court articulates general principles, reasoned and allegedly consistent. This special capability enables tort
to respond in distinctive ways to the threat catastrophe poses to law.
Furthermore, the democratic privilege of the legislature is not so
profound as it might initially seem. Though less directly representative,
courts deploying tort law nevertheless express majoritarian commitments.
The reasonable person standard disregards individual preferences and
imposes a communal norm. Justice Holmes argued that judges must, to
some extent, look to public morality to determine the content of that norm:
“[T]he general foundation of legal liability in blameworthiness, as determined by the existing average standards of the community, should always be
kept in mind, for the purpose of keeping such concrete rules . . . conformable to daily life.”128 Through accretional lawmaking, checked by a legislature
when necessary, tort law remains in conformity with prevailing standards of
conduct in society.129
The majoritarian character of tort stands in marked contrast to the
essentially libertarian values of property and, to a lesser extent, contract.
Property rights and contractual rights—with the significant exception of
mandatory rules—are distributed by private negotiation. As a result, David
Super argues, property can serve as a “bulwark[ ] against the majoritarian
state’s encroachment on individual liberties.”130 Super has a much gloomier
view of “regulation, tort, and even contract,” each of which is “explicitly or
implicitly majoritarian, reflecting the dominant view of the public good.”131
We share Super’s conclusion, though not necessarily his pessimism. On the
contrary, the anarchy precipitated by catastrophe demands a communal
response. In the absence of such collective pronouncements, a cacophony of
individual voices would create what Meyer imagines as a nihilist dystopia,
where “[e]very subjective complaint is as good as another” and “[j]ustice cannot be picked out from jealousy.”132 Tort law can reorder catastrophe by
articulating norms that are both generalist and majoritarian. Importantly,
125 Schwartz v. Abex Corp., 106 F. Supp. 3d 626, 652 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
126 Thompson v. Hi Tech Motor Sports, Inc., 945 A.2d 368, 378 (Vt. 2008).
127 Shelton v. Ky. Easter Seals Soc’y, Inc., 413 S.W.3d 901, 908 (Ky. 2013).
128 HOLMES, supra note 117, at 125.
129 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 13 (Harvard Univ.
Press, 2009).
130 David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1777 (2013).
131 Id. Peter Huber makes the same point in more polemical fashion: “The old contract-centered law placed enormous confidence in individuals to manage the risks of their
personal environments. The new, tort-dominated jurisprudence prefers universal rules
with no opt-out provisions.” HUBER, supra note 113, at 8.
132 Meyer, supra note 19, at 22.
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tort law does so using the logics of responsibility and justice, rather than
power and efficiency.
An important alternative account of tort law focuses not on communal
norms but rather on individual rights. For civil recourse theorists, the duty of
care on its own does not set tort law apart. John Goldberg and Benjamin
Zipursky argue, instead, that tort law is distinctive because it is privately
enforceable: “For a wrong to be a tort it must in principle generate for its
victim a private right of action: a right to seek recourse through official channels against the wrongdoer.”133 Although the public provides the forum, the
victim drives the action: “The victim, not a government official, decides
whether to press her claim or not, and the victim, in principle, also decides
whether to accept a resolution of the claim short of judgment.”134 Civil
recourse theorists envision tort as essentially libertarian, not majoritarian.
This vision seems to stand in tension with our expressed view of tort as a
system of communal norm articulation.
The tension turns out to be illusory. Over time, a series of individual
actions constitute a conversation between courts, government actors, and private victims and tortfeasors. That conversation fills in the vague doctrines of
tort law so that the norms articulated have a majoritarian character, even if
each lawsuit is private. “Tort law still applies community or collective norms,”
even though those norms “are spelled out through an iterative process of
individualized litigation, not through an intentional decision of some public
entity.”135 Justice Cardozo gave a similar account of emergent norms,
although he focuses primarily on the judicial role: “[A]s a system of case law
develops, the sordid controversies of litigants are the stuff out of which great
and shining truths will ultimately be shaped. The accidental and the transitory will yield the essential and the permanent.”136
Cardozo’s narrative suggests a final characteristic of the norms of tort
law: they are persistent. Common-law doctrine evolves only incrementally,
through the diffusion and acceptance of novel judicial interpretations. Calabresi argues that any effective legal system must “balance[ ] the need for continuity and change.”137 In the specific context of tort law, the standard of
reasonable care must both entrench stable norms and adapt to new circumstances that challenge those norms.138
In the canonical story, which Calabresi himself admits to be “idealized,”
the United States developed a “unique solution to meeting the two require133 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917,
918 (2010).
134 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended: A Reply to Posner, Calabresi, Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette, 88 IND. L.J. 569, 572 (2013).
135 Christopher H. Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental Regulation Does
that Tort Cannot Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 583, 585 (2002).
136 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 35 (1921).
137 CALABRESI, supra note 129, at 3.
138 See Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 48
(2011) (“Duty within the common law of tort must be attentive to changing circumstances
while remaining stable enough to honor private expectations.”).
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ments.”139 Common-law courts possess the authority to disregard precedent—to change the law—but judicial craft limits the scope and pace of such
change.140 Moreover, no single judge can work a sweeping transformation.
A doctrinal innovation in tort law must proliferate through dozens of jurisdictions for it to become fully entrenched. This process of diffusion advances
slowly and haphazardly. In a recent empirical study of the process, Kyle Graham found that “common-law innovations almost never spread at a rate of
more than three jurisdictions per year, with some flagging near the point of
full diffusion.”141 The law of torts does not turn on a dime.
Granted, legislatures often intervene in the common law. Rapid statutory reforms can undermine the resilience of the norms established by tort.
But, for our project, we must contrast statutory overrides that augment law’s
response to catastrophe with those that diminish it. In the latter category, we
might place the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which substantially insulated firearms manufacturers and dealers from tort liability for gun
violence.142 Congress passed the Act in response to a series of public nuisance lawsuits brought by municipalities and states.143 Although none of the
lawsuits had fully succeeded in court, some defendants did reform their business practices as part of settlement agreements.144 At the behest of the gun
lobby, Congress intervened to curtail most tort actions against weapons manufacturers and retailers. One of the few exceptions to immunity allowed
under the Act, for negligent entrustment of firearms, is being tested in a
lawsuit brought by relatives of victims of the mass shooting at Sandy Hook
Elementary School.145
139 CALABRESI, supra note 129, at 3–4 & n.10.
140 See id. at 4 (“[T]he requirements of the legal process, of ‘principled’ decision making, tended to limit the scope of judicial authority.”).
141 Kyle Graham, The Diffusion of Doctrinal Innovations in Tort Law, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 75,
150 (2015).
142 See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095
(2005) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012)) (immunizing gun manufacturers and
sellers and their trade associations from liability for most civil actions that are based on
harm caused by the “criminal or unlawful misuse” of firearms).
143 See Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1501, 1540 (2009).
144 Id. at 1541 & n.183.
145 The trial court dismissed the lawsuit on immunity grounds, and the plaintiffs’
appeal is now pending at the Connecticut Supreme Court. See Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, No. FBTCV156048103S, 2016 WL 8115354 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14,
2016), appeal docketed No. S.C. 19832 (Conn. Dec. 1, 2016). Family members of three men
killed in another mass shooting, at the Pulse nightclub in Miami, are testing another
sweeping congressional immunity provision by suing Facebook, Twitter, and Google for
their roles in allowing hate groups to spread propaganda and foster extremism online. See
Gal Tziperman Lotan, Families of Three Pulse Victims Sue Facebook, Twitter, and Google,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (December 20, 2016), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/pulseorlando-nightclub-shooting/os-pulse-social-media-lawsuit-20161220-story.html. In their
defense, the Internet companies will cite a key provision of the federal Communications
Decency Act, Section 230, which provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
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In contrast to such immunity bills, many statutes seek to acknowledge
wrongs and create rights of action where none had been recognized at common law. As a historical matter, the “ ‘statutorification’ of American law” over
the past 150 years has been driven by “technological and sociopolitical
changes that made slow, accretional, lawmaking unsatisfactory.”146 The
proliferation of workers compensation statutes during the late nineteenth
century provides a paradigmatic example. The crisis of factory accidents
presented both a practical and a normative challenge to tort law:
“[S]hocking rates of injury and death among industrial workers were difficult
to square with prevailing tort doctrines and the free labor ideology that supported them.”147 When common-law judges failed to adapt quickly enough,
legislatures supplanted them (along with a host of worker cooperatives,
employer-provided plans, and other private forms of compensation that had
been springing up in the absence of tort law).148
In the case of factory accidents, tort law failed because it could not
impose an attractive normative order on an increasingly complex modern
society. Failure of judicial ambition may invite legislative intervention in the
common law just as readily as imagined crises of liability.149 Tort may establish more durable norms, then, when it confronts catastrophe head-on. At its
best, tort can respond with principled urgency to unforeseen challenges. It
does so “not only by pricing and prohibiting conduct, but by helping to foster, sustain, and articulate norms.”150 When they are well stewarded, these
norms—generalist, majoritarian, and persistent—can give structure, weight,
and coherence to tort law’s narrative of catastrophe. Such stewardship,
though, requires willingness by judges to utilize tort law’s normative capacity
at a time when its practical force seems overwhelmed by catastrophic events.
B. Failures of Power
July 13, 1977, was a typically hot and humid summer day for New
Yorkers, with the temperature rising to 93 degrees Fahrenheit in Central
Park by 5:00 p.m.151 The sultry afternoon gave way to a stormy evening. At
about 8:37 p.m., a lightning bolt struck an electrical transmission tower
between the Millwood and Buchanan substations in New Castle, Westchester
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012). Plaintiffs allege
that the defendants should be treated as publishers given the way in which their algorithms
analyze, match, and channel user-generated content.
146 CALABRESI, supra note 129, at 1, 73.
147 Kysar, supra note 138, at 48 (citing JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC
7–8 (2004)).
148 See generally WITT, supra note 147.
149 See CALABRESI, supra note 129, at 74–76.
150 John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64 MD. L.
REV. 364, 386 (2005).
151 Record of Climatological Observations: New York Central Park Observatory, July 1977,
NOAA (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/orders/cdo/1054257.pdf.
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County.152 The circuit automatically shut down to dissipate the surge of electrical charge. Unbeknownst to the engineers at Consolidated Edison (“Con
Edison”), however, a damaged relay prevented the line from reopening, thus
choking off one of the largest conduits to New York City.153
The faulty relay set off a series of unfortunate events. Technical mishaps
prevented Con Edison from quickly ramping up generation within the five
boroughs.154 Due to a sequence of miscommunications, the systems operator did not learn of the Millwood-Buchanan shutdown until at least 9:08
p.m.155 At 9:23 p.m., the operator attempted to “shed load” manually—shutting down parts of the grid to prevent total failure—but he botched the complicated procedure.156 At 9:29 p.m., New York’s last connection to the
outside world was tripped. Suddenly, demand exceeded supply by 1700
megawatts. At 9:36 p.m., the city went dark.157
Although the blackout lasted only two days, it inflicted massive damages.158 Since most New Yorkers commute to work via public transit,
thousands of storefronts shuttered. Civil disorder erupted in multiple neighborhoods. The fire department and police responded to over 1000 alarms
and made nearly 3000 arrests in 27 hours.159 Economic costs amounted to at
least $350 million, almost half of which was attributed to looting and
arson.160 And, in his apartment building in Queens, seventy-seven-year-old
Julius Strauss ran out of water, which was supplied by an electric pump.161
On the afternoon of July 14, he attempted to descend the unlit stairwell to
fetch water from the basement. In the darkness, he fell and sustained severe
injuries.162 Strauss brought suit against his landlord and Con Edison for
gross negligence.
Although a straightforward personal injury suit on its face, Strauss’s lawsuit raised profound questions about the stability of legal order. Since earlier
litigation had established Con Edison’s negligence,163 the court in Strauss
had only to decide the extent of the utility’s resultant liability. In a remarkably candid opinion, the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint
“[o]n public policy grounds.”164 The court ostensibly centered its legal analysis on the question of duty, but this analysis did not truly control: “[I]t is . . .
152 G.L. Wilson & P. Zarakas, Anatomy of a Blackout, 15 IEEE SPECTRUM 39, 39 (1978).
153 Id. at 41.
154 Id. at 42.
155 Id. at 43.
156 Id. at 44.
157 Id. at 45–46.
158 For a helpful summary, see JANE L. CORWIN & WILLIAM T. MILES, SYS. CONTROL, INC.,
IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF THE 1977 NEW YORK CITY BLACKOUT (1978).
159 Id. at 14.
160 Id. at 5.
161 Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 35 (N.Y. 1985).
162 Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 469 N.Y.S.2d 948, 949 (App. Div. 1983).
163 See Food Pageant, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 429 N.E.2d 738 (N.Y. 1981); see also
Koch v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 468 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1984).
164 Strauss, 482 N.E.2d at 35.
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the responsibility of courts, in fixing the orbit of duty, ‘to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.’ . . . ‘[N]ot only logic and
science, but policy play an important role.’ ”165 In its overt realism, the
Strauss majority echoed Judge Andrews’s dissent in Palsgraf: “[B]ecause of
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily
declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.”166
Granted, the court in Strauss paid lip service to a traditional notion of
privity in contract. Since Strauss fell in a common area, the landlord was
technically the aggrieved customer.167 Such formalistic distinctions had long
since fallen by the wayside in 1985.168 Con Edison almost certainly owed
Strauss a duty of reasonable care. In fact, as the New York Court of Appeals
readily admitted, “an obligation rooted in contract may engender a duty
owed to those not in privity.”169 But catastrophic harms change the rules of
the game. In the face of “liability which could obviously be enormous,” the
court made a decision not “strictly governed by tort or contract law
principles.”170
The decision in Strauss epitomizes what Meyer would call a nihilistic
reading of catastrophe. Disaster strikes and overwhelms the legal order.
Tort law might begin to recolonize lost territory, subsuming chaos under normative principles such as “gross negligence” or “recklessness.” But tort law
might also pull up short when a plaintiff’s prayer for relief appears to
demand too much justice: “[P]ublic policy may at times result in the exclusion of some who might otherwise have recovered for losses or injuries if
traditional tort principles had been applied.”171
What exactly did the judges of the Court of Appeals fear? A dissenter
pointed out that Con Edison could easily distribute any costs among its consumers in the form of higher rates.172 The majority alludes only vaguely to
“the societal consequences of rampant liability.”173 Perhaps the judges
feared popular backlash: they doubted their majoritarian authority to redress
such massive harms. Or perhaps they feared that subsuming disaster under
165 Id. at 36 (citations omitted) (first quoting Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424
(N.Y. 1969); and then quoting De Angelis v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., 449 N.E.2d 406, 407 (N.Y.
1983)).
166 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
167 Strauss, 482 N.E.2d at 36 (“The essential question here is whether Con Edison owed
a duty to plaintiff . . . with whom there was no contractual relationship for lighting in the
building’s common areas.”).
168 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place
of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 719 (2001) (“[B]y 1985, privity was quite
appropriately undermined as a basis for no-duty arguments in the primary sense, at least
for physical injury caused by a defendant’s negligence.”).
169 Strauss, 482 N.E.2d at 36.
170 Id. (citations omitted).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 39 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
173 Id. at 38 (majority opinion).
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preexisting legal rules would threaten the persistence of tort’s command in
the “ordinary” case.174 Whatever the explanation, the Court of Appeals
lacked confidence in tort law’s generalist ability to domesticate disorder.
The tort reform movement imagines common-law courts as overambitious and out of control. “Every day,” one commentator claims, “brings new
reports of the ingenuity of American lawyers and the willingness of American
courts to entertain virtually any grievance.”175 Critics point to anecdotes in
which allegedly minimal harms lead to extravagant verdicts for plaintiffs.
Classic “tort tales” include a woman who spilled coffee on herself and sued
McDonald’s, a man who had a heart attack while mowing his lawn and sued
Sears, and a professional psychic who sued her doctor after a CAT scan
destroyed her abilities.176 A liability crisis threatens to furlough the worker,
immiserate the consumer, and depress the American “spirit of innovation
and enterprise.”177
The example of Strauss suggests a countervailing account: the torts process tends to undercompensate massive harms. Confronted by catastrophe,
tort jurists beat a hasty retreat, apparently convinced that faithful adherence
to principle will lead only to ruin. Such nihilism does not discriminate: even
the mighty Con Edison found itself a victim of tort’s normative retreat in the
wake of the 9/11 disaster. Seeking to recover for damages to its electricity
substation which was damaged after the 7 World Trade Center building
(7WTC) collapsed, Con Edison alleged that the structure had been negligently designed because applicable safety codes dictated that such buildings
should be able to withstand uncontrolled burning without collapse.178 The
appellate panel, however, fixated on the fact that the particular fires at issue
on 9/11 had been caused by an unprecedented terrorist attack on the neighboring Twin Towers. Indeed, the court likened the events to “a fire triggered
by a nuclear attack on lower Manhattan,” clearly implying that ordinary rules
of negligence liability would be suspended in such an event.179 Technically,
the court deemed Con Edison’s claim deficient for failing “to raise a genuine
issue of fact as to whether defendants’ negligence was the cause-in-fact of
Con Ed’s injury.”180 But that reasoning is unpersuasive, as Judge Wesley’s
short dissent amply demonstrates. What truly drove the majority’s decision
was a sense that tort law was simply usurped by “the unprecedented etiology
174 This argument typifies the nihilist response to catastrophe. See supra notes 52–53
and accompanying text.
175 Theodore B. Olson, The Social Consequences of Punitive Damages, in PERNICIOUS IDEAS
AND COSTLY CONSEQUENCES: THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF THE TORT CRISIS 55, 55 (Nat’l
Legal Ctr. for the Pub. Interest ed., 1990).
176 None of these caricatures holds up under closer inspection. See WILLIAM HALTOM &
MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS
64–68 (2014).
177 HUBER, supra note 113, at 14.
178 Aegis Ins. Servs., Inc. v. 7 World Trade Co., 737 F.3d 166, 169 (2d Cir. 2013).
179 Id. at 179–80.
180 Id. at 179.
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and severity of the cataclysm that engulfed lower Manhattan on September
11, 2001.”181
C. Climate of Fear
Prior to a nascent wave of suits brought in the wake of the Trump presidential election victory,182 four major climate change tort lawsuits had been
brought in American federal courts.183 Since we are especially concerned
with disastrous floods, we also note two cases that arose out of the devastation
wrought by Hurricane Katrina.184 Each case was ultimately dismissed on
grounds of justiciability, so no court has ever reached the merits of a climate
change tort claim in the United States. Others have ably analyzed the merits
of these lawsuits. We will focus instead on the methods and motivations of
the courts that dismissed them. We will focus, that is, on what Cover called
181 Id. at 180.
182 Recent lawsuits in California have asked courts again to confront the questions of
climate responsibility raised by prior climate complaints. The counties of Marin and San
Mateo and the city of Imperial Beach sued thirty-seven fossil fuel majors in state court on
July 17, 2017. See Press Release, California Communities Confronting Rising Sea Levels
Fight Back (July 17, 2017), https://www.sheredling.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/
Media-SLR-release-FINAL-PDF-071717.pdf. Subsequently, the cities of San Francisco and
Oakland filed a similar complaint against a smaller number of defendants. See Chris
Megerian, Bay Area Cities Sue Major Oil Companies over Climate Change, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 20,
2107), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-climate-1505933864-htmlstory.html. For several reasons, these various plaintiffs may succeed
where others have failed. The complaints present detailed evidence of an alleged conspiracy to cover up the risks of fossil fuel combustion, evidence that was not available to earlier
litigants. In addition, the plaintiffs pled only state law claims in an attempt to avoid displacement by the Clean Air Act. See Douglas Kysar, Fossil Fuel Industry’s ‘Tobacco Moment’
Has Arrived, LAW 360 (July 28, 2017), http://www.law360.com/environmental/articles/
948361/fossil-fuel-industry-s-tobacco-moment-has-arrived. This strategy will be tested in
the coming months. The defendants in the first set of California suits removed the cases to
federal court and the plaintiffs’ motions to remand are now pending in the Northern
District of California. See Motion to Remand, Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No.
3:17-cv-4929 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2017), ECF No. 144; Motion to Remand, City of Imperial
Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. 3:17-cv-4934 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2017), ECF No. 140; Motion
to Remand, Cty. of Marin v. Chevron Corp., No. 3:17-cv-4935 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2017),
ECF No. 144.
183 See generally Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C0605755, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, No. 1:05CV-436, 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30, 2007), rev’d, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009),
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d
1049 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (declining to reinstate the panel opinion); Connecticut v.
Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir.
2009), rev’d sub nom. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
184 See generally In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D.
La. 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d
436 (5th Cir. 2012); Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676
(E.D. La. 2006).
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“the hermeneutic of jurisdiction,” the interpretive methods courts use to
limit law’s response to violence and catastrophe.185 Although the precise
legal grounds for rejecting climate change claims have varied, the sheer size
of climate change disasters always weighs heavily on judges’ minds. Whether
through deference, displacement, or deliberate sabotage, anxious courts
have found ways to ignore the climate change plaintiff.
Comer provides an especially egregious example of judicial subterfuge
and self-limitation. Ned Comer and his coplaintiffs were landowners on the
Mississippi coastline. They sued two dozen fossil fuel corporations for compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the defendants’ emissions of
greenhouse gases had “caused a rise in sea levels and added to the ferocity of
Hurricane Katrina, which combined to destroy the plaintiffs’ private property.”186 Although the plaintiffs invoked diversity jurisdiction to reach federal court, all of their claims sounded in Mississippi common law: public and
private nuisance, fraud, and civil conspiracy, among others.187
The district court dismissed all claims for lack of standing without a written opinion.188 A panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiffs could show standing for private and public nuisance, though not for civil
conspiracy.189 The panel also refused to reject the complaint as a nonjusticiable political question, quoting with approval Chief Justice Marshall’s
famous words in Cohens v. Virginia: “We have no more right to decline the
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.”190 The defendants petitioned for rehearing en banc. The irregularity of what followed merits a full recounting.
Seven of the judges of the Fifth Circuit quickly recused themselves, leaving only nine judges to rule on the petition for rehearing, the bare minimum
required to make quorum.191 By a vote of six to three, the remaining judges
voted to grant rehearing on February 26, 2010.192 In accordance with the
Fifth Circuit’s local rules, the decision of the panel was automatically
vacated.193 Only two months later, Judge Jennifer Elrod, one of the nine
remaining judges, recused herself from the case due to mysterious “new circumstances.”194 Having lost its quorum, the eight-member court concluded
that “it was powerless to take any action other than to dismiss the appeal,”
185 Cover, supra note 18, at 56.
186 Comer, 585 F.3d at 859.
187 See id. at 859–60.
188 Comer, 2007 WL 6942285, at *1.
189 Comer, 585 F.3d at 865–68.
190 Id. at 872 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
191 Patrick A. Woods, Reversal by Recusal? Comer v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. and the Need
for Mandatory Judicial Recusal Statements, 13 U.N.H. L. REV. 177, 181 (2015).
192 Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 607 F.3d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(Davis, J., dissenting).
193 Woods, supra note 191, at 181–82.
194 Letter to the Parties, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010)
(No. 07-60756), ECF No. 00511097646.
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leaving the adverse district court decision as the final ruling on the merits.195
The three panel judges, who had voted against en banc review, dissented
vigorously.196
Since judges are not obliged to explain their recusal decisions, we may
never know why Comer met this ignominious end. The peculiar procedural
path raised suspicions of a deliberate dodge197 or even political corruption.198 But we need not endorse such speculation. For our purposes, Comer
exemplifies in stark fashion the nihilistic reading of catastrophe. The Fifth
Circuit stepped well outside the bounds not just of tort law but of transsubstantive civil procedure in order to avoid the merits of the complaint.
Though the chasm between legal principle and authoritative action yawns
particularly wide in Comer, we will see that such evasiveness has characterized
most judicial responses to climate change torts.
Perhaps the most influential climate change tort case to date is American
Electric Power. In that case, eight states and the City of New York sued five
large private utilities, along with the Tennessee Valley Authority, alleging
state and federal common law nuisances.199 American Electric Power has garnered much attention for the ultimate holding of the Supreme Court, which
ruled unanimously that the Clean Air Act displaces any federal common law
tort claims and, indeed, that the Act would displace federal tort claims even if
the Environmental Protection Agency declined to wield its regulatory authority to address greenhouse gas emissions (let alone the specific harms alleged
by plaintiffs).200
195 Woods, supra note 191, at 183–84.
196 See Comer, 607 F.3d at 1056 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (describing the majority opinion
as “shockingly unwarranted” and “manifestly contrary to law and Supreme Court
precedents”).
197 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Nash, 5th Circuit’s Shameful Disappearing Act, NAT’L L.J. (July 12,
2010), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202463364698; Steven M. Taber, Fifth Circuit Punts on Comer v. Murphy Oil Appeal—Dismisses Appeal on Procedural Grounds, Not Merits, ENVTL. L. & CLIMATE CHANGE L. BLOG (June 4, 2010), https://taberlaw.wordpress.com/
2010/06/04/fifth-circuit-punts-on-comer-v-murphy-oil-appeal-dismisses-appeal-on-proce
dural-grounds-not-merits/.
198 In particular, various commentators pointed to the judges’ financial interests in the
oil industry. See, e.g., Nan Aron, The Corporate Courts: Fifth Circuit Judges Are Marinating in
Oil, HUFFINGTON POST (July 7, 2010, 5:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nan-aron/
the-corporate-courts-fift_b_638591.html; Cara Horowitz, Comer Craziness: Appellate Nuisance Victory Overturned, Despite Lack of Quorum (!), LEGAL PLANET (May 28, 2010), http://
legal-planet.org/2010/05/28/comer-craziness-appellate-nuisance-victory-overturned-de
spite-lack-of-quorum; Judicial Gusher: The Fifth Circuit’s Ties to Oil, ALLIANCE FOR JUST. (Apr.
2014), http://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/fifth_circuit_judges_report.pdf.
199 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F.
Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Am.
Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
200 See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 425 (2011) (“The Act itself
thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic powerplants—the same relief the plaintiffs seek by invoking federal common law. We see no
room for a parallel track.”). The Court’s reference to “parallel track[s]” represents a con-
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Sweeping as that holding may be, the opinion of the district court better
illustrates the jurisdictional anxieties provoked by climate change litigation.
The district court did not even consider the displacement issue; instead, it
threw out the case as presenting a nonjusticiable political question. Formally, the district judge grounded the analysis in a six-part test articulated by
Vieth v. Jubelirer, concluding that merits adjudication would be an “impossibility” without making “an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”201 But a stray remark in this section of the opinion
betrays the concern that drove the district court’s reasoning: “The scope and
magnitude of the relief Plaintiffs seek reveals the transcendently legislative
nature of this litigation.”202 From a purely legal standpoint, of course, speculation about the form and extent of remedy at this stage is largely irrelevant.
But the threat of injunctive relief often casts a pall over environmental tort
claims.203 Just as in Strauss, the district court in American Electric Power seems
to have been awed and cowed by the lawsuit’s bigness.
A panel of the Second Circuit reversed, again citing Cohens for the
judge’s duty to decide: “The fact that a case may present complex issues is
not a reason for federal courts to shy away from adjudication; when a court is
possessed of jurisdiction, it generally must exercise it.”204 In light of this
debate below, the Supreme Court’s ultimate holding seems partly a reflection
of that Court’s aversion to tort law, and partly a belief about comparative
institutional competence and deference to agency expertise.205 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s ruling had the same practical effect as any other
dismissal on justiciability grounds. The plaintiffs were left stranded, without
even a substantive response to their normative claims.
In 2007, while American Electric Power was still pending in the Second
Circuit, the State of California brought a separate action against various
automakers for monetary damages stemming from the defendants’ contribuflation of tort law with regulation, failing to acknowledge tort’s norm-articulation and compensatory functions, let alone the manner in which tort law can serve as an important
source of regulatory redundancy and inter-branch signaling in light of predictable government failure. See infra text accompanying notes 219–20.
201 Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278
(2004) (plurality opinion)).
202 Id.
203 See Kysar, supra note 138, at 26–27.
204 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 329 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)), rev’d sub nom. Am. Elec. Power, 564
U.S. 410. For all his ambivalence about judicial action, Cover probably would have
endorsed this embrace of judicial responsibility. “The courts,” he wrote, “cannot avoid
responsibility for applying or refusing to apply power to fulfill a redemptionist vision.”
Cover, supra note 18, at 60.
205 See Klass, supra note 143, at 1565 (arguing that the Supreme Court views tort as a
mere “arm of the public regulatory state”). The liberal Justices may also have been motivated by a desire to consolidate the holding of Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007),
which established that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.
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tions to global warming.206 Citing the district court’s ruling in American Electric Power, the district judge in California’s suit likewise dismissed the claims
as posing nonjusticiable political questions.207 And again, the sheer size and
complexity of the harms haunted the court. As compared to other transboundary nuisance lawsuits, the court argued, “[p]laintiff’s global warning
nuisance tort claim seeks to impose damages on a much larger and unprecedented scale.”208 After all, “there are multiple worldwide sources of atmospheric warming across myriad industries and multiple countries.”209
California ultimately decided not to pursue an appeal, citing political progress on federal fuel efficiency standards.210 The district court opinion thus
stands as another chapter in tort’s retreat before climate change.
A separate category of climate litigants does not plead climate-change
causes of action but nevertheless seeks redress of climate-related harms. This
description sweeps broadly, and we will make no effort at a comprehensive
survey here.211 Instead, we focus on two particular cases that arose from
flood damages after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. In Barasich, a putative class
of residents of southern Louisiana sought damages for personal injury and
property loss exacerbated by oil drilling and pipeline construction.212 The
complaint alleged that the defendant corporations had destroyed millions of
acres of marshland through their dredging and drilling operations, thus decimating a crucial protective barrier against storm surge.213 The plaintiffs in
Barasich had no need to link the hurricanes’ ferocity to climate change itself;
rather, they relied on the direct conduct of the defendants and on Louisiana’s capacious negligence standard: “Every act whatever of man that causes
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.”214
Despite these favorable signs, the district judge granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss. Notably, the court rejected the notion that the case
presented a nonjusticiable political question, explicitly refuting the defendants’ analogy to American Electric Power.215 Nevertheless, the court held that
the plaintiffs failed to state a claim of either trespass or negligence under
206 See California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755, 2007 WL 2726871, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
207 Id. at *8 (“Just as in AEP, the adjudication of Plaintiff’s claim would require . . . the
type of initial policy determination to be made by the political branches, and not this
Court.” (citation omitted)).
208 Id. at *15.
209 Id.
210 See Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal at 2–3, California v. Gen. Motors. Corp.,
2009 WL 1915707, at *2–3 (9th Cir. June 19, 2009) (No. 07-16908).
211 For a systematic analysis of the various forms of climate change litigation, see David
Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012).
212 See Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 678 (E.D. La.
2006).
213 See id. at 679.
214 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2010).
215 Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 685–86.
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Louisiana law.216 The court proffered multiple reasons for its decision, but
its concerns centered on issues of proximity and causation. First, it narrowly
construed the principle that trespass liability lies among “neighbor[s].”217
Then, in fixing the orbit of duty for purposes of negligence, the court
emphasized that the defendants “were physically and proximately remote
from plaintiffs or their property.”218 Finally, the court expressed doubt
about actual causation where a large class of defendants had jointly caused
the plaintiffs’ harms.219
Although these findings went to the merits of the lawsuit in a technical
sense, the court in Barasich was motivated by concerns of scope and size similar to those we saw in Strauss and American Electric Power. In a revealing conclusion, the court accepted the plaintiffs’ basic premise but recoiled from the
suit’s spatial and temporal complexity: “By all accounts, coastal erosion is a
serious problem in south Louisiana. . . . [P]erhaps a more focused, less ambitious lawsuit between parties who are proximate in time and space, with a less
attenuated connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s
loss, would be the way to test their theory.”220 The lawsuit failed not because
it contravened traditional tort principles but because it took those principles
to their logical (and ethical) conclusion. The plaintiffs reached a point
where “the weight of the case moved it from the domain of tort to politics,
from adjudication to regulation,” where the scale of harm overwhelmed the
perceived capabilities of the common law.221
Another sprawling class of post-Katrina litigation centered on the now
notorious Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet canal, commonly known as MR-GO.
A wide array of plaintiffs sued the Army Corps of Engineers for negligently
constructing and maintaining the navigation canal, which “greatly aggravated
the storm’s effects on the city and its environs.”222 As one might expect, the
case turned not on a full assessment of the Corps’s acts and failures but on
the narrower question of sovereign immunity. The Flood Control Act of
1928 had immunized the federal government from liability for most flood
damages in order to promote levee construction.223 Despite initial success in
federal district court, the lawsuits foundered in the Fifth Circuit. That court
held that, although the Flood Control Act did not bar recovery, the Corps
was separately immunized by the discretionary-function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.224
216 Id. at 695.
217 Id. at 690.
218 Id. at 693.
219 See id. at 694.
220 Id. at 695.
221 Kysar, supra note 138, at 53.
222 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 2012).
223 See 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2012); see also A. Dan Tarlock, United States Flood Control Policy:
The Incomplete Transition from the Illusion of Total Protection to Risk Management, 23 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 151, 160 & n.50 (2012) (explaining how sovereign immunity fostered
“structural defense through dams and levees”).
224 Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d at 448–52; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012).
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The final disposition of the MR-GO litigation is inarticulate, resting on
an arbitrary classification of actions as discretionary or nondiscretionary. Its
full meaning becomes clearer when juxtaposed with the Corps’s crucial role
in the hydrogeology of modern Louisiana. As Dan Tarlock and others have
recounted, the current system of massive, federally funded fortifications
began as a congressional response to the devastating floods of April 1927.225
Indeed, as noted above, the Mississippi would no longer even flow through
New Orleans but for the Corps’s Herculean efforts to control the course of a
river that once migrated across hundreds of miles like a gushing, unattended
hose.226 Meanwhile, having bolted the Mississippi in place, the Corps built
New Orleans’s defenses to protect against a “standard project hurricane” that
severely understated the actual risk facing the city.227 Yet, from the perspective of tort law and the sovereign’s overriding power to deny its own agency
and responsibility, this history created no binding duty. In a remarkable conclusion to its opinion, the district court in the MR-GO litigation described a
“heart-wrenching” story of “egregious myopia” and “bureaucratic inefficiency” that ended in the plaintiffs’ harms.228 Nevertheless, the judge
lamented, “[i]t is not within this Court’s power to address the wrongs
committed.”229
The limitations of tort litigation have thwarted even the most sympathetic of climate change plaintiffs. The most poignant defeat came in the
case of Native Village of Kivalina. In that case, an Alaskan Inupiat village of
about 400 residents sued twenty-four large energy corporations, seeking relocation costs for their village which is threatened by rising seas, reduced sea
ice, and permafrost thawing.230 Of all the first wave American climate tort
suits, Kivalina was the best pled. In addition to sympathetic plaintiffs, the
case rested on a traditional cause of action—the exclusive use and enjoyment
of property—and sought only modest damages, at least as compared to the
defendants’ profits.231 Nevertheless, the district court dismissed the federal
common law nuisance claims on justiciability grounds. Specifically, the court
found that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, focusing on the extended
causal link between the defendants’ conduct and the plaintiffs’ injuries.232
To apply such public law notions of standing to a private law tort case is
strange. The elements of standing doctrine—injury-in-fact, causation, redres225 See Tarlock, supra note 223, at 159–60.
226 See supra text accompanying notes 92–100.
227 For a detailed discussion of the flaws in the standard project hurricane, see KYSAR,
supra note 66, at 75–88.
228 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d 615, 643 (E.D. La.
2008).
229 Id.
230 Complaint ¶¶ 1–4, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. cv-08-1138) [hereinafter Kivalina Complaint].
231 The villagers sought the cost of relocation, which the Army Corps of Engineers estimated at $95–400 million. Id. ¶ 1. For further discussion of the strengths of the Kivalina
complaint, see Kysar, supra note 138, at 27–29.
232 See Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 880–81.
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sability—were in fact inspired by the very elements of tort law that ensure a
plaintiff’s grievance bears an adequately particularized relationship to a
defendant’s wrongdoing. Thus, rather than conduct a Potemkin version of
the case through cramped standing analysis, the Kivalina court should have
directly addressed the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim.
Perhaps the Kivalina complaint is more notable for a claim that the district court specifically declined to address: state law civil conspiracy. The
plaintiffs in Kivalina argued that the defendants had engaged in a “campaign
to deceive the public about the science of global warming,” aggravating the
nuisance suffered by the village.233 The fossil fuel industry, the complaint
alleged, had deliberately propped up front groups to spread misinformation
and distort public opinion on the issue of climate change, thereby preventing
legislative and regulatory responses.234 In effect, the plaintiffs asked the
court to find that the political branches had been duped, that the defendants’ actions had compromised democracy itself. Unsurprisingly, the court
did not reach this question. With almost audible relief, the district court
declined to extend supplemental jurisdiction to the state law claims.235 On
appeal, subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in American Electric
Power, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the remaining claims as displaced by federal statute.236
Thus the Inupiat villagers, like many climate change plaintiffs before
them, were left to cope as best they could, outside the reach of tort law’s
norm-generating and compensatory functions. Denying its own expansive
power, the common law once again cowered before catastrophe. To be clear,
we labor under no illusions about climate change plaintiffs’ chances of success should they ever reach the merits of a tort claim.237 But, merely by refusing to decide and offer principled reasons on the merits of these cases, courts
surrender crucial normative territory in law’s confrontation with catastrophe.
III. SEEKING HIGHER GROUND
Thus far we have mostly discussed what lies beyond law: the plaintiff
ignored, the rule suspended, the nomos overthrown. In Part I, we defined
catastrophe as the disruption of an established normative order. Climate
change threatens to routinize catastrophe and bring about either a “permanent revolution” or a “permanent state of exception,” an unending series of
breaks with past legal forms.238 Extreme as this portrayal may sound, we saw
in Part II that judges have gone to extraordinary lengths to avoid jurisdiction
over climate change suits. Although tort law could accommodate catastrophe, many courts have preferred to respond with nihilism.
233
234
235
236
237
238

Kivalina Complaint, supra note 230, ¶¶ 272–73.
Id. ¶¶ 189–248.
Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 882–83.
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
See Kysar, supra note 138, at 9–10.
Battistoni, supra note 17, at 179–80.
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A handful of recent cases have interrupted this trend. Judges in the
Netherlands239 and Pakistan240 delivered the first significant victories to climate change plaintiffs. The Netherlands decision invoked tort-like principles of duty and negligence on the part of the national government, while
the Pakistan case turned on questions of constitutional and administrative
law. In the United States, meanwhile, an activist group called Our Children’s
Trust has begun filing lawsuits in multiple jurisdictions in an effort to expand
the public trust doctrine to encompass atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions. To date, the group has achieved two notable victories. In Washington
State, a trial judge ordered the state Department of Ecology to promulgate a
new greenhouse gas emissions rule by the end of 2016.241 In Oregon, a federal district judge has denied the government’s motion to dismiss in a lawsuit
alleging that federal inaction on climate change violates the plaintiffs’ Fifth
Amendment rights.242 A trial—the “trial of the century”243—could take
place in 2018.
The ultimate consequence of these litigation victories remains highly
uncertain. Three of the cases have not yet reached final disposition, and
their full effect will depend on political as well as judicial action. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the more dynamic, adaptive, and restless forms of
jurisdictional assertion required in an age of unlimited harm. In these cases,
judges knew well that they declined to avail themselves of myriad maneuvers
that would have, at least superficially, justified avoiding the claims. Instead,
they chose to confront the merits head on in an effort to reclaim threatened
normative ground—in an “outlandish attempt[ ] to do more with a court
[than] perhaps we would think might plausibly be done.”244 Strauss, Comer,
and Kivalina are tales from lands lost to sea, where law has been abandoned.
Urgenda, Leghari, and Juliana, in contrast, are tales from higher ground.
They recount jurisdictional struggles that define the boundary between legal
order and catastrophic overturning.

239 See Rb. Den Haag 24 juni 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (Urgenda Foundation/Netherlands) (Neth.) [hereinafter Urgenda Decision], http://deeplink.rechtspraak.
nl/uitspraak?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196.
240 Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2015) W.P. No. 25501 (HC Lahore) (Pak.) [hereinafter Leghari Decision], https://elaw.org/system/files/pk.leghari.090415_0.pdf.
241 See Order on Petitioners’ Motion for Relief Under CR 60(b) at 3, Foster v. Wash.
State Dep’t of Ecology, 362 P.3d 959 (Wash. 2015) (en banc) [hereinafter Foster Order],
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/57607f4901dbaec63
4f08166/1465941834691/16.05.16.Order_.pdf.
242 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1261–63 (D. Or. 2016).
243 Chelsea Harvey, Trump Could Face the ‘Biggest Trial of the Century’—Over Climate
Change, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-envi
ronment/wp/2016/12/01/trump-could-face-the-biggest-trial-of-the-century-over-climatechange/?utm_term=.11dd428779d0.
244 Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179,
191 (1985).
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A. Doctrinal Evolution in Urgenda
If a trend eventually does emerge of judicial leadership in the articulation of climate change norms, the trend’s source will be traced to a threejudge panel of the Hague District Court which, in 2015, offered a wellspring
of inspiration. The Urgenda Foundation, a not-for-profit organization that
undertakes research and advocacy related to climate change, sued the Dutch
government on behalf of itself and 886 individuals.245 The summons, filed
on November 20, 2013, challenged the “unjustifiable negligence of the
Dutch State in not adopting the necessary and proportionate level of ambition in its climate policy.”246 Urgenda demanded a declaration that “the
Dutch State is acting unlawfully towards plaintiffs” and an order that the
Netherlands reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by at least twenty-five percent by 2020 as compared to 1990 levels.247
In its lengthy opinion, the court summarized volumes of climate change
science and recounted the uneven history of international climate negotiations. Relying on findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC), the court announced that carbon dioxide concentrations
must stabilize below 450 parts per million “to prevent dangerous climate
change.”248 The court concluded that “the State . . . has acted negligently
and therefore unlawfully towards Urgenda by starting from a reduction target for 2020 of less than 25% compared to the year 1990.”249 It ordered the
government “to limit the joint volume of Dutch annual greenhouse gas emissions, or have them limited.”250
The opinion largely eschewed high rhetoric. Marshaling a plethora of
scientific and legal authorities, the court sought to project continuity, not
creativity. Nevertheless, catastrophe lurked in the background. The complaint warned that action was “necessary and urgent to prevent dangerous
climate change that will have catastrophic consequences for the lives of millions of people.”251 The court’s decision adopted a similar tone when
describing scientific findings: “Well before the 1990s, there was a growing
realisation among scientists that human caused (anthropogenic) greenhouse
gas emissions possibly led to a global temperature rise, and that this could
have catastrophic consequences for man and the environment.”252 In the
face of these “catastrophic consequences,” the Dutch judges rejected the
245 Arthur Nelsen, Dutch Government Ordered to Cut Carbon Emissions in Landmark Ruling,
GUARDIAN (June 24, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/24/
dutch-government-ordered-cut-carbon-emissions-landmark-ruling.
246 Summons ¶ 32, HR 20 november 2013 (Urgenda Foundation/Netherlands) [hereinafter Urgenda Summons], http://www.urgenda.nl/documents/FINAL-DRAFT-Transla
tion-Summons-in-case-Urgenda-v-Dutch-State-v.25.06.10.pdf.
247 Id. at 121.
248 Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶ 4.31.
249 Id. ¶ 4.93.
250 Id. ¶ 5.1.
251 Urgenda Summons, supra note 246, ¶ 420.
252 Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶ 4.11.
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nihilism that has typified the response of American courts. Instead, they
appeared closer to Meyer’s judges who deny catastrophe, “reframing it as
injustice, expanding the bounds and jurisdiction of law.”253
The decision has elicited praise and enthusiasm from environmental
lawyers and activists alike.254 For the most part, we share that enthusiasm.
The Dutch court undertook the sort of bold action appropriate to an era of
climate change. Moreover, significant portions of the opinion provide an
analysis of negligence liability legible to any student of the American torts
process. Urgenda’s summons made claims of both transboundary nuisance
and unlawful endangerment.255 Under Dutch common law, “endangerment” is a close analogue of negligence in the American context. The leading case, titled Kelderluik or Cellar Hatch, describes a risk-utility framework
remarkably similar to the Hand formula.256 Public nuisance, meanwhile, has
much the same flavor as in the United States: the Kalimijnen or Potash Mines
case involved upstream industrial pollution on the Rhine River.257 The
Urgenda court combined its analysis of the two claims.258 The resulting opinion proceeds in textbook fashion through the classic elements of a tort claim:
duty, breach, causation, and harm.
In earlier work, one of us has discussed the inadequacies of traditional
tort doctrine to accommodate the climate change plaintiff: “At each stage of
the traditional tort analysis—duty, breach, causation, and harm—the climate
change plaintiff finds herself bumping up against doctrines that are premised on a classical liberal worldview in which threats such as global climate
change simply do not register.”259 In the paradigmatic tort claim, a single
defendant has injured a single plaintiff. Because the injury was immediately
foreseeable, the defendant breached a clear duty. Finally, the defendant’s
actions were both a necessary and a sufficient cause of the observable physical harm to the plaintiff. Climate change—a vast global problem described
by probabilistic scientific models—strains against these requirements at every
turn.
253 Meyer, supra note 19, at 21.
254 See, e.g., Quirin Schiermeier, Landmark Court Ruling Tells Dutch Government To Do
More on Climate Change, NATURE (June 24, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/landmarkcourt-ruling-tells-dutch-government-to-do-more-on-climate-change-1.17841; Ari Shapiro,
The Dutch Ruling on Climate Change that Could Have a Global Impact, NPR (June 25, 2015),
http://www.npr.org/2015/06/25/417349227/the-dutch-ruling-on-climate-change-thatcould-have-a-global-impact.
255 See Urgenda Summons, supra note 246, ¶¶ 261, 265.
256 See generally Gerrit Van Maanen et al., The Dutch ‘Cellar Hatch’ Judgment as a
Landmark Case for Tort Law in Europe: A Brief Comparison with English, French and German Law
with a Law and Economics Flavour, 5 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 871 (2008).
257 See Suryapratim Roy & Edwin Woerdman, Situating Urgenda v the Netherlands
Within Comparative Climate Change Litigation, 34 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 165, 171
(2016).
258 Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶ 4.51.
259 Kysar, supra note 138, at 9–10.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL107.txt

2017]

unknown

courting disaster

Seq: 39

9-NOV-17

13:29

333

The earlier work also posits that the massive harms inflicted by climate
change could still result in “significant secondary effects for the common
law.”260 If courts begin to adjudicate the merits of climate change lawsuits,
they might find that “the effort to fit the mother of all collective action
problems into the traditional paradigm of tort reveals much about how that
paradigm more generally needs to shift.”261 One story of tort law in the
twentieth century is a gradual evolution toward systemic thinking: broad,
communitarian duties of care; statistical understandings of risk rather than
direct notions of causation; apportionment of damages across multiple
defendants and plaintiffs; recognition of anticipated but unrealized harms.
A successful climate change lawsuit in the United States would require all of
these trends to culminate within a single case—a tall order indeed. But the
actual adjudication of climate change lawsuits could move courts toward
these doctrines in “more garden variety environmental and toxic tort
suits.”262 The Urgenda decision offers an opportunity to contemplate these
doctrinal predictions in the dramatic context of articulating a nation’s constitutional tort-like duties of care to its own present and future populations.
1. Duty and Breach
The central challenge for a court that seeks to define a duty of care for
the climate lies in the remote and attenuated effects of greenhouse gas emissions: “[C]limate change is so radically diffuse in origin that it is difficult to
identify any actors who stand out as peculiarly responsible for it.”263 Since
the activities of no one person, entity, or even nation can influence global
change, the argument goes, no one can be held responsible for the combined effect: “[I]t is not negligent to fail to contribute to a public good if not
enough others are doing similarly, so that the public good would not be created even if one did contribute.”264
This argument, which we dub the “consequentialist alibi,” starts to disintegrate under catastrophe’s centrifugal pull. The moral intuition of the
“consequentialist alibi” relies on a conventional, linear understanding of risk:
if I generated only one-trillionth of the world’s carbon emissions, I bear only
one-trillionth of the responsibility for climate change. But the threat of “tipping points” and sudden, nonlinear consequences creates at least an imaginable possibility that “[a single individual’s] contribution was the one that
pushed the planet over the edge.”265 Since the probability of such an event
is unknowable, and its consequences irreversible,266 no approach other than
260 Id. at 47.
261 Id. at 44.
262 Id. at 71.
263 Id. at 18.
264 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Global Warming and Social Justice, REGULATION,
Spring 2008, at 19, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/
2008/2/v31n1-3.pdf.
265 Kysar, supra note 138, at 51.
266 See supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text.
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precaution seems to respect the rights and interest of future generations.
Complex systems, in other words, defy the “presentist and individualistic orientation of classical liberalism.”267 They demand moral attention to issues
that the proponents of risk-utility analysis would discount: precaution, distribution, and intergenerational justice.268
The Urgenda decision gave all three their due. The opinion states
unequivocally that “the most serious consequences of climate change have to
be prevented.”269 In determining the scope of the duty of care, the judges
affirmed that “the policy should not only start from what is most beneficial to
the current generation at this moment, but also what this means for future
generations.”270 In addition, the court called for “the prevention or limitation of the negative consequences of climate change, regardless of a certain
level of scientific uncertainty.”271 These premises inflected the court’s riskutility analysis. The Dutch court did enumerate the Carroll Towing factors:
“the chance that hazardous climate change will occur” (P), “the nature and
extent of the damage ensuing from climate change” (L), and “the onerousness of taking precautionary measures” (B).272 But, in analyzing potential losses, the court did not engage with the various studies that have
attempted to assign a specific value to the economic costs of climate
change.273 The opinion instead described the “serious consequences” of climate change in qualitative terms and concluded that “mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions in the short and long term is the only effective way to
avert the danger of climate change.”274
267 Kysar, supra note 138, at 52.
268 Cf. Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and
Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 207, 213 (2003) (describing—but criticizing—the “conventional wisdom” that European regulators tend generally
to favor precautionary approaches). Even Richard Posner and Cass Sunstein, in their
respective treatments of catastrophe, seek to carve out exceptions from standard cost-benefit analysis for uncertain risks of catastrophic harms. See POSNER, supra note 10, at 148
(defending a “modest version of the precautionary principle”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF
FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 114–15 (2005) (defining the “Anti-Catastrophe Principle”). Their response, though, is to mechanically incorporate risk aversion premiums and other numerical adjustments that allow cost-benefit analysis to otherwise
operate as usual. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE
L.J. 385, 433 (2004) (proposing the use of an “extermination premium” to weigh more
heavily outcomes in which an entire population dies, as opposed to simply summing the
value of all the individual lives comprising a population).
269 Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶ 4.71.
270 Id. ¶ 4.57.
271 Id. ¶ 4.58.
272 Id. ¶ 4.63(i), (iii), (v).
273 For an overview and critique of these studies, see Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1577–96
(2011). In particular, Masur and Posner argue that several of the most prominent economic analyses “may be underestimating the probability of catastrophic events by significant margins.” Id. at 1580–81 & n.102.
274 Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶ 4.71.

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL107.txt

2017]

unknown

courting disaster

Seq: 41

9-NOV-17

13:29

335

The Dutch court seemed to rely on international law as part of its negligence analysis: “[O]bjectives and principles, such as those laid down in the
UN Climate Change Convention and the [Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union], should also be considered in determining the scope for
policymaking and duty of care.”275 The opinion stressed that “the State has
known since 1992, and certainly since 2007, about global warming and the
associated risks,” citing the dates of the U.N. Framework Convention and the
Bali Conference.276 These references, which recur in other passages of the
opinion, suggest that the judges tacitly inflected their negligence analysis
with international-law norms and understandings.277
Within the confines of tort law, however, the international agreements
provide evidence that the harms of climate change are foreseeable. Foreseeability plays a central role in defining the duty of care, although that role
remains contested. In the canonical tale, the dueling opinions in Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad Co.278 represent two contrasting viewpoints on an inescapably vague aspect of tort. Judge Cardozo favors a formalist relational
duty, defined by the “eye of ordinary vigilance,”279 while Judge Andrews
defends a broad, communal duty, limited by practical considerations of proximate cause.280 Both approaches tend to converge on a common core question, however: “[B]y the exercise of prudent foresight; could the result be
foreseen?”281
As a result, the era of chaos, catastrophe, and climate change puts both
approaches under strain: “[T]wenty-first century problems are likely to be
ones characterized by predictable unforseeability.”282 If greater understanding does not yield increased predictive power, how can a standard of care
tied to foreseeability protect the public from harm? In the products liability
context, a handful of courts have held manufacturers liable whether or not
they could have known of a defect at the time of manufacture.283 This “constructive knowledge” approach does away with a strict foreseeability requirement and imposes “more dynamic duties of humility, caution, and
investigation.”284 The Urgenda court, for all its discussion of international
climate change commitments, hinted that it favored this broad duty. In distinguishing the earlier Cellar Hatch ruling, which adopted a more conventional duty analysis, the court stated: “This case is different in that the central
275 Id. ¶ 4.55.
276 Id. ¶ 4.65.
277 See infra notes 310–11 and accompanying text; see also Tracy Bach, Human Rights in a
Climate Changed World: The Impact of Cop21, Nationally Determined Contributions, and National
Courts, 40 VT. L. REV. 561, 583 (2016) (“When ruling for Urgenda, the trial court relied on
the intersection of international human rights and domestic tort law.”).
278 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
279 Id. at 99.
280 Id. at 101–105 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
281 Id. at 104.
282 Kysar, supra note 138, at 56–57.
283 David G. Owen, Bending Nature, Bending Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 569, 601 n.174 (2010).
284 Kysar, supra note 138, at 58.
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focus is on dealing with a hazardous global development, of which it is uncertain when, where and to what extent exactly this hazard will materialise.”285
In the face of such uncertainty, the Dutch court chose not to constrain duty,
but radically to expand it.
But it does not suffice to demonstrate that a duty exists. A climate
change plaintiff must also show that the defendant, by its action or inaction,
has breached that duty. Here again, the court must choose between a corrective, relational analysis and more open-ended balancing test: “Nuisance law
generally . . . has long oscillated between a ‘trespass’ mode of analysis and a
‘cost-benefit’ mode of analysis.”286 Climate change plaintiffs stand a better
chance if they can convince the court to “focus on the severity of the alleged
harm, rather than on a welfarist assessment of whether the defendant’s activity is socially desirable on net.”287 This distinction, which classically delineates the boundary between trespass and nuisance,288 parallels in some
respects the boundary between strict liability and negligence. The negligence standard assigns liability only if the individual defendant’s actions were
unreasonable. Strict liability preempts this judgment with a general finding
as to the “abnormally dangerous” nature of the activity.289
For a student of law and economics, strict liability is justified where an
activity’s externalized costs exceed its externalized benefits.290 But American
courts have traditionally assumed that industrial activities realize net external
benefits and have accordingly rejected broad imposition of strict liability.291
Likewise, in trespass and nuisance litigation, courts have found ways to avoid
granting injunctive relief against industries of great economic importance.
Even where a court adopts a strict version of nuisance liability, it can import
social welfare analysis at the remedy stage and decline to issue an
injunction.292
The Urgenda decision departed from these patterns. First, the Dutch
court stated that “there is no serious obstacle from a cost consideration point
285 Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶ 4.54.
286 Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293,
329 (2005).
287 Kysar, supra note 138, at 25.
288 See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights,
14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 13 (1985).
289 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
290 See Keith N. Hylton, The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for Environmental Regulation, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 683 (2008).
291 Cf. HOLMES, supra note 117, at 95 (“A man need not, it is true, do this or that act,—
the term act implies a choice,—but he must act somehow. Furthermore, the public generally
profits by individual activity. As action cannot be avoided, and tends to the public good,
there is obviously no policy in throwing the hazard of what is at once desirable and inevitable upon the actor.” (emphasis added)).
292 See, e.g., Davis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 445 P.2d 481, 483 (Or. 1968) (holding that
“the social value of defendant’s conduct, its efforts to prevent the harm and other circumstances that tend to justify an intrusion cannot be considered” when assessing trespass liability, but that such considerations do apply when assessing whether injunctive relief
should be afforded).
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of view to adhere to a stricter reduction target,” thus dispensing with the
presumption of net economic benefits.293 Any policy that would fail to limit
carbon dioxide concentrations to below 450 parts per million breached the
duty of care.294 Accordingly, “the Netherlands must take reduction measures
in support of this scenario.”295 The court’s analysis focused entirely on the
hazards of climate change, not the culpability of the Dutch government’s
conduct. The threat of extreme events drove the Dutch court to question
standard assumptions about reasonable conduct in industrialized societies.
“Judicial interest in strict liability,” one of us has argued, “may revive as the
accumulated negative externalities of greenhouse gas emissions come to
loom far larger than the felt positive externalities of economic activity.”296
Perhaps the Urgenda decision reflects early judicial awakening to this new
order.
2. Causation and Harm
The focus on the global dimensions of climate change—its breathtaking
scale and severity—may undermine the plaintiff’s case at the causation stage.
Complexity and numerosity, already troublesome for establishing duty,
return with even greater force when the plaintiff attempts to single out individual defendants’ contributions to global warming. The orthodox principle
of “but-for causation” requires that the defendant’s activity was a necessary
condition of the plaintiff’s harm.297 But although the science of climate
change is well understood, the sheer complexity of the climate system frustrates most attempts to link particular harms to greenhouse gas emissions.298
Moreover, the great number of emitters again allows defendants to offer a
rather powerful version of the “consequentialist alibi” introduced above. The
Dutch government, for instance, argued that because Dutch emissions
amounted to only 0.5% of the global total, the court could not redress any
harm Urgenda might be suffering: “[A]llowing Urgenda’s claim . . . would
not be effective on a global scale, as such a target would result in a very
minor, if not negligible, reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions.”299
293 Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶ 4.70.
294 Id. ¶ 4.83
295 Id.
296 Kysar, supra note 138, at 59.
297 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
298 See Seneviratne et al., supra note 6, at 127 (“[I]t is challenging to associate a single
extreme event with a specific cause such as increasing greenhouse gases because a wide
range of extreme events could occur even in an unchanging climate, and because extreme
events are usually caused by a combination of factors.”). That said, some events can fairly
be described as “signature impacts of climate change” amenable to causal attribution.
Kysar, supra note 138, at 32. For instance, human influences made the 2003 European
heat wave more than twice as likely, Seneviratne et al., supra note 6, at 127, and scientists
have forecasted continued permafrost melting with “high confidence,” id. at 189–90.
299 Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶ 4.78.
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The consequentialist alibi may be correct in a technical sense. But it
takes as its premise a world of cynical, narrowly rational actors: “Unable at
the global level to coordinate behavior through law or shared social norms,
[actors] instead expect the worst from others and thereby bring out the worst
in themselves.”300 The Urgenda decision turned this logic on its head.
Rejecting the pessimism of a game theoretic “commons tragedy” vision of the
world, the judges viewed the global challenge as an opportunity for mutual
consideration and coordination: “It is an established fact that climate change
is a global problem and therefore requires global accountability.”301 The
opinion continued:
The fact that the amount of the Dutch emissions is small compared to other
countries does not affect the obligation to take precautionary measures in
view of the State’s obligation to exercise care. After all, it has been established that any anthropogenic greenhouse gas emission, no matter how
minor, contributes to an increase of CO2 levels in the atmosphere and therefore to hazardous climate change. Emission reduction therefore concerns
both a joint and individual responsibility of the signatories to the UN Climate Change Convention.302

The Urgenda decision held the Dutch government accountable, through
negligence doctrine, for its announced positions on climate change. As the
lead attorney explained, “it was a conscious decision to bring tort law to bear
against a national government rather than against the fossil fuel sector. In
contrast to companies, national governments have made quite explicit statements . . . regarding the danger of climate change and what should be done
about it.”303 In giving effect to those statements and in rejecting the consequentialist alibi, the Dutch court articulated a more hopeful moral vision,
one in which “an upward spiral from acts of leadership and self-sacrifice . . .
brings out the best in all.”304
This moral vision suggests a more sophisticated understanding of causal
linkage. Classical tort law clings to direct, mechanical notions that do not
accurately describe the reality of complex, interwoven causal relationships.
Scientists have long since abandoned the Newtonian ideal in favor of probabilistic models of causation.305 The legal echo takes the form of innovations
in causation doctrine: joint and several liability for asbestos exposure,306 mar300 Kysar, supra note 138, at 51.
301 Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶ 4.79.
302 Id.
303 Roger Cox, A Climate Change Litigation Precedent: Urgenda Foundation v. The State
of the Netherlands, CIGI Papers No. 79 (Nov. 2015), at 2.
304 Kysar, supra note 138, at 51.
305 A thorough description of this philosophical transition lies outside the scope of this
project. For a summary, see Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role
of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 469, 478–83
(1988).
306 See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 162–65 (2003) (rejecting
defendant’s argument that damages must be apportioned with other past employers);
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that,
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ket-share liability,307 and loss-of-chance recovery for patients whose diseases
were likely terminal notwithstanding a doctor’s mistakes.308 Although these
doctrines remain at the margins of tort practice, a warming world may
prompt courts to look at them in a more favorable light. The scientific consensus on climate change is overwhelming, and it favors the plaintiffs, at least
with respect to matters of general causation.309 Engagement with that consensus might again bend judicial attitudes toward more scientifically nuanced
and doctrinally innovative approaches to the assignment of responsibility
within a world of complexity and uncertainty.310
The Urgenda court did engage with the science, discussing at length the
factual findings of the IPCC.311 But the court was relieved of the need to
articulate detailed normative implications of the science, given that plaintiffs
sought only to hold the Dutch government to its own previously stated commitments.312 The particular grounds of decision matter because legal
authority, unlike scientific theory, defines normative commitments.313 A
finding of legal causation reflects not an empirical fact but rather a commuif each defendant was “the cause in fact of some injury,” they may be held jointly and
severally liable).
307 The leading case is Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). Market share
liability has largely not caught on outside the DES context. See, e.g., Doe v. Cutter Biological, 852 F. Supp. 909, 913, 924–25 (D. Idaho 1994) (declining to adopt market share or any
other alternative causation doctrine to aid plaintiff hemophiliacs who had contracted HIV
from infusion of tainted Factor VIII clotting agent), appeal dismissed, 89 F.3d 844 (9th Cir.
1996) (dismissed upon death of plaintiff). For rare exceptions, see In re Methyl Tertiary
Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); State v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 126 A.3d 266 (N.H. 2015); and Suffolk Cty. Water Auth. v. Dow Chem.
Co., 987 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Sup. Ct. 2014).
308 See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 819, 828–29 & n.23 (Mass. 2008)
(observing that “[t]he highest courts of at least twenty States and the District of Columbia
have adopted the loss of chance doctrine” and joining them).
309 See John Cook et al., Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the
Scientific Literature, 8 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 024024 (2013) (“[T]he number of papers
rejecting the consensus on AGW is a vanishingly small proportion of the published
research.”).
310 See Kysar, supra note 138, at 65 (hypothesizing a “cultural shift among judges in
their attitudes toward scientific evidence”).
311 Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶¶ 2.8–2.21.
312 As part of the 2010 Cancun Agreements, the Dutch government had accepted in
principle that emissions reductions of twenty-five to forty percent by 2020 would be
required to limit greenhouse gas concentrations to acceptable levels. Id. ¶ 4.24. Compare
the litigation dilemma facing plaintiffs in the Juliana litigation, who have premised their
complaint on the notion that a specific scientifically determined concentration level of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (350 parts per million) must be maintained in order to
avoid violation of their fundamental rights. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224,
1263 (D. Or. 2016). Naturally, the federal government in its answer has denied that scientific consensus on such a “safe limit” exists.
313 Brennan, supra note 305, at 471 (“The function of causation in law is not simply to
imitate current scientific knowledge; rather, the law uses causal concepts not only to link
events, but also to provide moral prescriptions.”).
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nity’s judgment that moral responsibility can attach to the censured conduct.
Consider the fact that some of the harms wrought by climate change will not
fully materialize for several decades at the earliest.314 Traditionally, tort law
does not allow recovery for the mere threat of future harm.315 Likewise, in
order to establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate an injury
that is “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’ ”316 The Second Circuit, ruling for the plaintiffs in American Electric Power, avoided this
difficulty by finding that the defendants’ current greenhouse gas emissions
created a certainty of future harm: “There is no probability involved.”317 But
this solution creates secondary problems at the merits stage with respect to
causation. Climate change plaintiffs need courts to give more credence, not
less, to probabilistic causal linkages between distant actors.
The claims of climate change plaintiffs challenge the assumptions that
undergird traditional understandings of liability and causal attribution.
Common-law courts are beckoned to learn to “think ecologically”:
Distances that seemed remote become more intimate, as the natural pathways that connect them are brought into view. Accordingly, it becomes less
comfortable to maintain the traditional assumptions that “natural” and “distant” interests are less important than those that are “manmade” and
“immediate.”318

Thinking ecologically, courts would pay more attention to the reality of
complex and catastrophic risks. Where those risks are severe, though uncertain or temporally distant, a judge would not reject the plaintiff’s claim of
injury for those reasons alone. The Urgenda decision adopted such a position
quite explicitly:
[I]t is established that if the global emissions, partly caused by the Netherlands, do not decrease substantially, hazardous climate change will probably
occur. In the opinion of the court, the possibility of damages for those
whose interests Urgenda represents, including current and future generations of Dutch nationals, is so great and concrete that given its duty of care,
the State must make an adequate contribution, greater than its current contribution, to prevent hazardous climate change.319
314 For a summary of various long-term trends in water security due to climate change,
see Blanca E. Jiménez Cisneros et al., Freshwater Resources, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. PART A: GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 229, 249 tbl.3-2 (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., 2014),
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-Chap3_FINAL.pdf.
315 See, e.g., Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1138 (Cal. 2000) (“The breach of a
duty causing only speculative harm or the threat of future harm does not normally suffice
to create a cause of action.”).
316 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02 (1983)).
317 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 344 (2d Cir. 2009).
318 Kysar, supra note 138, at 69.
319 Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶ 4.89.
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The mere “possibility of damages” was “so great and concrete” that it
rose to the level of a cognizable wrong. With the limited exception of medical monitoring costs,320 American courts do not so boldly expand the reach
of legal redress for claims sounding in tort.
*

*

*

At every stage of its analysis, the Urgenda court overcame doctrinal barriers to a finding of climate change negligence against the most powerful
defendant in its jurisdiction: the sovereign itself. Only through such an attitude of restless vigilance can tort law bring catastrophic harms within law’s
normative project. The plaintiffs knew that Dutch statutory and regulatory
law did not provide “sufficient protection against the risks of dangerous climate change.”321 But the common law—and the bodies of constitutional
and international law that partake of tort-like reasoning against government
actors—can counteract the intransigence of power while at the same time
establishing persistent norms of its own creation.322
The Dutch court did not, however, reach out by fiat to supplant democratic processes. Judicial decisionmaking shapes and reflects popular understandings of reasonable care in an ongoing process of conversation with the
other branches of government.323 In this context, it is notable that the first
victory for climate change tort plaintiffs should come in a nation with a far
less militaristic relationship to its natural environment. On the lower Mississippi River, U.S. flood control strategy from the beginning has centered on a
policy of containment, with the walls growing ever higher as the land subsides and the ocean rises.324 The Dutch, on the other hand, have transitioned to a policy of “controlled flooding.” Low-lying polders must in some
320 Medical monitoring refers to “diagnostic and other pre-therapeutic measures
designed to determine whether an individual exposed to the risk of contracting a disease
or other unhealthy condition has in fact done so.” Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability for Medical Monitoring and the Problem of Limits, 88 VA. L. REV. 1975, 1976 (2002). In other words,
liability attaches not for the “enhanced risk” itself, but rather for the “medical surveillance
expenses” the enhanced risk necessitates. Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 308 (N.J.
1987).
321 Cox, supra note 303, at 3.
322 See supra text accompanying notes 129–41.
323 See Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶ 4.95 (“The court states first and foremost
that Dutch law does not have a full separation of state powers, in this case, between the
executive and judiciary. The distribution of powers between these powers (and the legislature) is rather intended to establish a balance between these state powers. . . . It is an
essential feature of the rule of law that the actions of (independent, democratic, legitimised and controlled) political bodies, such as the government and parliament can—and
sometimes must—be assessed by an independent court.”).
324 See Oliver Houck, Can We Save New Orleans?, 19 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 42 (2006) (“In
this view, the natural environment may not be the enemy but it is at least an impediment.
We wall it off, and then feed it through the bars of diversion structures like some beast in a
zoo.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL107.txt

342

unknown

Seq: 48

notre dame law review

9-NOV-17

13:29

[vol. 93:1

cases serve as reservoirs, to be flooded if necessary to protect denser
communities.325
Of course, the Urgenda decision did not discuss matters of flood control
policy and environmental ethics. But the reciprocal relationship between
communal and legal norms should remind us that tort doctrines embody
various and even conflicting standards of conduct in society. The common
law judge is neither a consequentialist, nor a deontologist, nor a civil
recourse theorist. She is a pluralist, reexpressing and reconstituting multiple
strains of moral and legal discourse. The Urgenda judges drew on a wide
range of texts, including a Dutch constitutional provision, the “no harm”
principle of international law, the U.N. Climate Change Convention, and
various European Union treaties, all in addition to Dutch common law.326
Tort law does not, as Meyer charged, reflexively impose liability for any conceivable injury. But it can, at its best, respond creatively and dynamically to a
world of chaotic and unpredictable harms.
B. Political Conversation and Legal Narrative
The Urgenda decision has already begun inspiring similar attempts by
climate change plaintiffs to negotiate the torts process.327 In addition, at
least three more lawsuits—making claims of constitutional and administrative
violations—have brought about judicial responses to climate change harms
that exemplify the central claims of this Article. A Pakistani student prevailed
in his effort to force the government to implement its stated climate change
policy.328 And two groups of American plaintiffs have achieved initial success
in expanding the public trust doctrine to encompass a stable climate.329
Unlike the Urgenda decision, these cases reveal little about how tort doctrine itself could evolve in response to climate change and catastrophe. In a
more general sense, however, the plaintiffs’ victories embody the ways in
which litigation can spur urgent and creative responses to complexity and
catastrophe. First, courts can demand action from other branches of government either through injunctive relief or simple exhortation. For an example
of the latter, consider Justice Ginsburg’s dissent from the decision in Ledbetter
325 See Michael Kimmelman, Going with the Flow, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/arts/design/flood-control-in-the-netherlands-now-allowssea-water-in.html.
326 See Urgenda Decision, supra note 239, ¶¶ 4.52, 4.76.
327 Another tort lawsuit is pending in the Belgian court system. See Jennifer M. Klein,
Lawsuit Seeks to Force Belgian Government to Take Action Against Climate Change, CLIMATE L.
BLOG (June 8, 2015), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2015/06/08/lawsuitseeks-to-force-belgian-government-to-take-action-against-climate-change/.
328 Leghari Decision, supra note 240, at 2.
329 See Findings & Recommendations at 1276, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d
1224 (D. Or. 2016) (No. 6:15-cv-1517) [hereinafter Juliana Findings & Recommendations];
Foster Order, supra note 241.
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v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.330 The five-Justice majority had adopted a narrow reading of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in order to bar the plaintiff’s
pay discrimination claims. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting from the bench,
called on Congress to “act to correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of
Title VII.”331 The legislature responded with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009,332 which codified the interpretation urged by Justice Ginsburg.333
As one of us has argued with Benjamin Ewing, such “prods and pleas”
represent the “flip-side of checks and balances.”334 In a constitutional
scheme of divided but overlapping authority, the judiciary can serve not only
to temper excess but also to break up gridlock.335
1. Prods and Pleas in Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan
The decision in Leghari provides an especially bold example of judicial
prodding and pleading. Although the opinion from the Lahore High Court
used the language of fundamental rights, the order itself aimed to facilitate
more effective cooperation among various government officials. Pakistan’s
Ministry of Climate Change had promulgated a National Climate Change
Policy in September 2012 in order to “provide[ ] a comprehensive framework” for “Action Plans” to adapt to the effects of climate change.336 The
Policy laid out an ambitious series of goals,337 but the frailty of the Climate
Change Ministry hampered its effectiveness.338 Ashgar Leghari, a law student whose family owns a farm in southern Punjab, sued the central government claiming that the agencies’ intransigence infringed upon his
fundamental rights.339
Judge Syed Mansoor Ali Shah convened representatives from over
twenty government bodies to announce his decision. His opinion issued a
self-described “clarion call” to defend the “fundamental rights of the citizens
330 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
331 Id. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
332 Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
333 For a full account of the influence of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, see Lani Guinier,
Beyond Legislatures: Social Movements, Social Change, and the Possibilities of Demosprudence—
Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 B.U. L. REV. 539 (2009).
334 Ewing & Kysar, supra note 5, at 361.
335 See id. at 411–12.
336 MINISTRY OF CLIMATE CHANGE, GOV’T OF PAK., NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY, at
vi (2012), http://center-hre.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Pakistan-Naitonal-Climate
-Change-Policy.pdf.
337 Id. at 1.
338 See, e.g., Zofeen T. Ebrahim, Pakistan’s New Climate Change Ministry Merely “Cosmetic,”
PAKISSAN (Feb. 2015), http://www.pakissan.com/english/issues/pakistan.new.climate.
change.ministry.merely.cosmetic.shtml.
339 Anam Gill, Farmer Sues Pakistan’s Government to Demand Action on Climate Change,
REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/pakistan-climatechange-law
suit/farmer-sues-pakistans-government-to-demand-action-on-climate-change-idUSL8N1383
YJ20151113.
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of Pakistan” and “in particular, the vulnerable and weak segments of the society who are unable to approach this Court.”340 Judge Shah invoked several
constitutional provisions and declared that they “include[d] within their
ambit” a number of environmental commitments: sustainable development,
the precautionary principle, intergenerational equity, and the public trust
doctrine.341 The order established a Climate Change Commission, to be
staffed by government officials and a handful of private individuals, which
would “assist this Court to monitor the progress of the Framework.”342
The unilateral creation of a new administrative body seems to be an
extreme remedy by American standards. But Judge Shah could not will a
powerful agency into being. As the opinion itself acknowledged, successful
adaptation would depend on the cooperation of existing authorities.343
Thus, the order of the Lahore High Court played substantially the same role
as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Ledbetter. The court’s words lacked the force
of law, in a practical sense. Their power—if they had power at all—was to
bring renewed attention to a neglected issue: to plead “for other branches or
levels of government to deploy power when the speaker cannot.”344 As the
head of the Pakistani World Wildlife Fund observed, “[t]he judge is pushing
the government departments to take action . . . [t]he commission is a ray of
hope for us.”345
2. The Environmental Apocalyptic in Foster and Juliana
Meanwhile, four years after the defeat in Kivalina, climate change plaintiffs have won two unexpected victories in American courts. In Foster v. Washington Department of Ecology, eight schoolchildren from Washington sued the
state government after its environmental agency denied their petition for a
rulemaking on greenhouse gas emissions. In one sense, the case was a typical
administrative action: the petitioners demanded relief under the Washington
Administrative Procedure Act asserting that the agency’s denial was arbitrary,
capricious, and in violation of statutory and constitutional law.346
340 Leghari Decision, supra note 240, ¶ 6.
341 Id. ¶ 7.
342 Id. ¶ 8(iii); see also Leghari v. Fed’n of Pakistan, (2015) W.P. No. 25501 (HC
Lahore) (Pak.), http://edigest.elaw.org/sites/default/files/pk.leghari.091415.pdf (supplemental order listing the officers of the commission).
343 Leghari Decision, supra note 240, ¶ 4.
344 Ewing & Kysar, supra note 5, at 366. Consistent with this role, the most recent
“order” in the Leghari case consists of a series of recommendations by the Climate Change
Commission to sharpen adaptation efforts. See Climate Change Order-19, Leghari v. Fed’n
of Pakistan, (2015) W.P. No. 25501 (HC Lahore) (Pak.), http://sys.lhc.gov.pk/greenBenchOrders/RegularityAuthorities-EPA-25501-15-10-03-2017.pdf.
345 Gill, supra note 339 (quoting Hameed Naqi, Director General of WWP-Pakistan).
For further discussion of the Leghari litigation and Judge Shah’s ongoing supervision of the
commission, see David Estrin, Limiting Dangerous Climate Change: The Critical Role of Citizen
Suits and Domestic Courts—Despite the Paris Agreement, CIGI Papers No. 101 (May 2016).
346 Petitioners’ Opening Brief at 11, Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology (Wash. Super. Ct.
Mar. 16, 2015) (No. 14-2-25295-1) [hereinafter Foster Petitioners’ Brief], https://static
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But the substance of their argument was far from routine. The children
asserted their “inherent and fundamental rights to a healthful and pleasant
environment.”347 These natural rights, though not explicit in the text of the
Washington Constitution, were preserved and protected by Washington’s
analogue to the Ninth Amendment: “The enumeration in this Constitution
of certain rights shall not be construed to deny others retained by the people.”348 The plaintiffs buttressed their assertion of a fundamental right with
an appeal to the public trust doctrine.349 On November 19, 2015, the judge
in Foster delivered what might have been a perfunctory ruling: because the
Department of Ecology had initiated a rulemaking in August, the petition for
review was denied as moot. But the opinion did not stop there. Judge Hill
emphasized, all in dicta, that “global warming causes an unprecedented risk
to the earth,”350 that the state constitution bestows environmental rights,351
and that the public trust doctrine extends to the atmosphere.352 Six months
later, unsatisfied by the agency’s progress, the court ordered the Department
of Ecology to finalize the climate change rule by the end of 2016.353
The Department of Ecology complied with the court’s order, issuing the
final Clean Air Rule on September 15, 2016.354 Nevertheless, the government appealed Judge Hill’s ruling to escape continued monitoring by the
trial court. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals granted that
request, reversing the decision to order extraordinary relief on the ground of
various legal infirmities.355 But the appellate court declined the government’s invitation to opine on the merits of the earlier November 2015 ruling.356 Thus, at least formally, the dramatic legal conclusions regarding the
scope of environmental rights remain in effect. As a practical matter, the
lawsuit achieved its central goal, and the debate has now moved into wider
public forums.357
1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/576080e81bbee08251f2841c/14
65942249247/ATL.Opening+Brief.Final_.3.16.14.pdf.
347 Id. at 17.
348 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 30.
349 Foster Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 346, at 19.
350 Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1, 2015 WL 7721362, at *2 (Wash.
Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 2015).
351 Id. at *3.
352 Id. at *4.
353 See Order on Petitioners’ Motion for Relief Under CR 60(b), Foster v. Wash. Dep’t
of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 (Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 29, 2016), http://static1.squarespace.
com/static/571d109b04426270152febe0/t/57607f4901dbaec634f08166/1465941834691/
16.05.16.Order_.pdf.
354 16 Wash. Reg. 19-047 (Sept. 15, 2016) (codified at WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-441,
173-442 (2017)).
355 Foster ex rel. Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 75374-6-I, 2017 WL 3868481
(Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017).
356 Id. at *3.
357 As with many environmental rulemakings, both activists and industry have condemned the Clean Air Rule on opposing grounds. Compare Press Release, W. Envtl. Law
Ctr., Inslee Administration Defies Court Order, Betrays Children (June 1, 2016), http://
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Our Children’s Trust convened a separate group of plaintiffs to bring a
lawsuit in federal court. On August 12, 2015, nineteen-year-old Kelsey Juliana and twenty other young people from across the country filed a complaint
against the United States government and a number of federal departments
and officials.358 Juliana v. United States expands on the arguments put forward in Foster and attempts, in one fell swoop, to constitutionalize climate
change policy.
The plaintiffs in Juliana present four grounds for relief. The Ninth
Amendment and public trust claims are analogous to those in Foster,
although the public trust doctrine imposes fewer obligations on the federal
government than the states.359 The bulk of the complaint in Juliana focuses
instead on arguments under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Citing
Obergefell v. Hodges,360 the plaintiffs assert that substantive due process should
be further expanded to include the right to a stable climate: “Defendants
have violated and are violating Plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights to
life, liberty, and property by substantially causing or contributing to a dangerous concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere.”361 The complaint then moves
to an equal protection argument, emphasizing the “dual principles” embedded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.362 The plaintiffs argue that
strict scrutiny should apply to measures that burden future generations:
“Future generations do not have present political power or influence, have
immutable characteristics, and are also an insular minority.”363
www.commondreams.org/newswire/2016/06/01/inslee-administration-defies-court-orderbetrays-children, with Tom Banse, Industry Lawsuits Mount Against Washington State’s New
Carbon Cap, NW. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 30, 2016), http://nwpr.org/post/industry-lawsuitsmount-against-washington-states-new-carbon-cap.
358 The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 10, 2015, and future citations are to that document. See First Amended Complaint, Juliana v. United States, No.
6:15-cv-01517 (D. Or. Sept. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Juliana Amended Complaint].
359 See Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past & Charting Its
Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 680–81 (2012) (“[L]ittle progress has occurred over the
past 30 years in making federal resources and officers subject to the same, public-trustbased obligations that apply to state and local governments in most American
jurisdictions.”).
360 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
361 Juliana Amended Complaint, supra note 358, at 94; see also id. at 84–88.
362 Id. at 89; cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” That
Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (“[D]ue process and equal
protection, far from having separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix.”).
363 Juliana Amended Complaint, supra note 358, at 89; cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (applying heightened scrutiny to sex-based discrimination because “sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic
determined solely by the accident of birth”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (describing “relegat[ion] to such a position of political powerlessness
as to command extraordinary protection” as one of the “traditional indicia of suspectness”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
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Up until this point, the rights-based argument for environmental protection has been confined largely to law review articles.364 Juliana v. United
States sought to provoke the first direct response from a federal judge. And
the scale of relief requested is provocative indeed: “Order Defendants to prepare and implement an enforceable national remedial plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions and draw down excess atmospheric CO2 so as to stabilize
the climate system” and “[r]etain jurisdiction over this action to monitor and
enforce Defendants’ compliance with the national remedial plan and all associated orders of this Court.”365 The government’s motion to dismiss focused
heavily on the requested remedy, starting with its very first sentence: “To provide the relief requested by Plaintiffs in this case, the Court would be
required to make and enforce national policy concerning energy production
and consumption, transportation, science and technology, commerce, and
any other social or economic activity that contributes to carbon dioxide
(‘CO2’) emissions.”366
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Juliana case is that the plaintiffs have not yet lost. They achieved an early victory: on November 10,
2016—perhaps not coincidentally, one day after the election of President
Trump who had campaigned against taking climate change seriously as a policy matter—Judge Aiken denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss, adopting the findings and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Coffin.367 Thus,
at least one U.S. federal judge has—squarely and unblinkingly—recognized
the possibility of an environmental due process claim:
[W]here a complaint alleges governmental action is affirmatively and substantially damaging the climate system in a way that will cause human deaths,
shorten human lifespans, result in widespread damage to property, threaten
human food sources, and dramatically alter the planet’s ecosystem, it states a
claim for a due process violation.368

Judge Aiken’s order cannot be appealed as of right to the Ninth Circuit,369 and the children’s lawyer has stated that they are “ready to bring the
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). It
is somewhat inapposite to describe future generations as a “minority” because—one
hopes—they will eventually outnumber present generations. Nevertheless, they are situated functionally like “insular minorities” due to the temporal dominance of present generations over their future environment and life circumstances.
364 See, e.g., Bruce Ledewitz, Establishing a Federal Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment in Us and in Our Posterity, 68 MISS. L.J. 565 (1998).
365 Juliana Amended Complaint, supra note 358, at 94.
366 Federal Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Their
Motion to Dismiss at 1, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517 (D. Or. Nov. 17, 2015).
367 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1234 (D. Or. 2016). Two separate
motions to dismiss were filed in the case, one by the government and another by a group
of interveners representing the fossil fuel industry. Id. at 1233–34.
368 Id. at 1250.
369 See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3914.6 (2d
ed. 2016) (“Orders refusing to dismiss an action almost always are not final.”).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\93-1\NDL107.txt

348

unknown

Seq: 54

notre dame law review

9-NOV-17

13:29

[vol. 93:1

case to trial.”370 Nevertheless, the defendants asked the court to certify an
interlocutory appeal of the order, a request that Judge Aiken denied on June
8, 2017.371 Undeterred, the next day the government filed a petition for a
writ of mandamus at the Ninth Circuit, arguing that an extraordinary writ was
needed “to confine the district court to the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction.”372 Perhaps the Ninth Circuit will grant the request, although appellate
courts are normally skeptical of such petitions.373 For now, the preliminary
order stands, nailed to the courthouse door, an open indictment of a political failure to protect future generations.
We could frame the initial rulings in Foster and Juliana as prods and
pleas as well. In Foster, Judge Hill began with nonbinding exhortation—a
plea—and then escalated to a court-ordered rulemaking—a prod.374 In Juliana, Judge Aiken acted in the knowledge that few immediate consequences
would flow from her order. Perhaps the opinion is best understood, then, as
primarily “calling attention to a problem of social need and asking for its
resolution.”375 But, of course, Judge Aiken also acted with the knowledge
that—so long as her jurisdiction is preserved—judicial action can go beyond
merely promoting interbranch dialogue and influencing political agenda setting. By accepting the facial legitimacy of plaintiffs’ claims on substantive
370 John D. Sutter, Kids Are Taking the Feds—and Possibly Trump—to Court over Climate
Change, CNN (Nov. 10, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/10/opinions/sutter-trumpclimate-kids/index.html.
371 Order Denying Certification for Interlocutory Appeal, Juliana v. United States, No.
6:15-cv-01517, 2017 WL 2483705 (D. Or. June 8, 2017).
372 Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to the United States District Court for the District
of Oregon at 31, United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Or., No. 17-71692 (9th Cir.
June 9, 2017), ECF No. 10467675.
373 See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980) (per curiam) (“[T]he
remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.”).
The Ninth Circuit has temporarily stayed proceedings in the district court and requested
briefing from parties, amici, and the district court itself. See Order, United States v. U.S.
Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Or., No. 17-71692 (9th Cir. July 28, 2017), ECF No. 10525423. In
an unusually personal and compelling response, Judge Aiken and Magistrate Judge Coffin
jointly offered insight on “how we are managing this unusual case,” concluding with the
following remarkable request for trust and respect in the traditional role of judges to adjudicate even the most vexing and controversial disputes:
Collectively, we have more than fifty years of experience on the bench. We have
managed countless complex lawsuits and have recognized from the beginning
that this action raises special and significant concerns regarding the appropriate
role of the courts in protecting constitutional rights. We are managing this case
mindful of those concerns. In our view, permitting this case to proceed through
the usual process of trial and appeal will present the Ninth Circuit with a superior
record to review, facilitating better decisionmaking on these novel and vitally
important issues.
Response of District Court to Writ of Mandamus, United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist.
of Or., No. 17-71692 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 2017), ECF No. 10558462.
374 See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 5, at 361 (describing prods as “action-forcing” and
pleas as “action-inviting”).
375 Id.
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due process grounds, Judge Aiken opened the possibility that she will deploy
the kind of injunctive and supervisory powers that courts have used in desegregation and institutional reform contexts.
Such powers notwithstanding, the challenge for the plaintiffs in Juliana
is to achieve normative reconstruction knowing that the court, in all likelihood, will not end up deploying its coercive power. Absent the threat of
injunctive relief, can a tribunal nevertheless shape the lifeworld of meaning?
A purely instrumental view of legal process does not respond to this question
as we have posed it. In particular, the managerial, welfarist perspective—a
dominant strain of contemporary environmental thought376—does not recognize the narrative function of legal dialogue. In contrast, Michael Burger
has argued forcefully that environmental law is best understood as “a battle
among well-defined, well-known and competing stories.”377 Drawing on the
work of law and literature scholars, Burger describes how lawyers, judges, and
litigants enact “expressive, literary performances” that shape law into “a producer of meanings and an avenue for self-expression.”378
Legal actors employ narrative for two basic purposes. First, narratives
determine which facts will receive judicial notice: “[M]uch of human reality
and its ‘facts’ are not merely recounted by narrative but constituted by it.”379
The weak version of this claim is that, in an adversarial system, both sides
“spin” the available evidence to buttress their argument. More fundamentally, in a complex system, the choice of value criteria will determine what
gets observed to begin with.380 The second role of narrative, which flows
from the first, is to explain and order normative disruptions: “Narratives . . .
are deeply concerned with legitimacy: they are about threats to normatively
valued states of affairs and what it takes to overcome those threats.”381 When
a “[s]cript[ ]” embodying “normal expectations and normal practice” is broken, we form cultural narratives to “domesticat[e] the breakings.”382 Cover
described legal discourse along similar lines, as a “system of tension or a
bridge linking a concept of a reality to an imagined alternative,” both represented “through the devices of narrative.”383
376 See Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and
Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1128 (2010) (criticizing a “dominant attitude in which the
only realistic, hence responsible, approach to climate change and other environmental
problems is one of instrumentally rational resource management constrained by interestbased politics”).
377 Michael Burger, Environmental Law/Environmental Literature, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 12
(2013).
378 Id. at 13–14.
379 ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 111 (2000).
380 Cf. Sanjay G. Reddy & Benjamin Plener, The Choice of Index Number: Part I, Valuation
and Evaluation (Inst. for Soc. & Econ. Research & Policy, Working Paper No. 06-02, 2006)
(demonstrating that, in seeking to measure the aggregate wealth of an economy, “normative judgments are inescapable”).
381 AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 379, at 121.
382 Id. at 121–22.
383 Cover, supra note 18, at 9.
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Narrative, in other words, is perfectly situated to accomplish Meyer’s
“reframing” of catastrophe. The adjudicatory process can develop and legitimate narrative even when it ends in defeat. Laura King explains that, for the
injured plaintiff, tort law offers a variety of legal claims through which inarticulate pain can be “channeled into the ritual and creative moves and
countermoves made by the opposing lawyers.”384 Litigation, in other words,
can be therapeutic:
[A]ll the formal trappings that may attend a lawsuit—service of the complaint, briefing, oral argument, courtrooms with their stated and unstated
rules of conduct and dress, written opinions—transform something that was
once personal, perhaps even unseen, into a visible, formalized activity upon
which a community turns its sober attention.385

An economic analysis views tort law as little more than a compensation
system with high transaction costs. Within that narrow framework, climate
change litigation has been a failure. But, viewed through the lens of legal
narrative, “the creation of a new legal claim has power wholly apart from the
power of a litigation victory (or litigation loss) or a court decision.”386 Even
in defeat, the climate change plaintiff may inspire new understandings of our
confrontation with catastrophe.
Burger and King analyzed the role of narrative in the climate change
nuisance cases: Comer, Kivalina, and American Electric Power. But the “ecocritical vocabulary”387 they developed also helps parse the audacious litigation
strategy of Our Children’s Trust. For Burger, climate change litigation reenacts a parable he names the “environmental apocalyptic.”388 Although many
prophecies of ecological collapse have gone unfulfilled, apocalypse remains
“the single most powerful master metaphor that the contemporary environmental imagination has at its disposal.”389 This Article joins—or at least conveys—a strain of that tradition.390 The environmental apocalyptic adopts the
literary form of the jeremiad, a mournful critique of society’s profligacy.391
Since the days of Jonathan Edwards, the jeremiad has comprised four rhetorical moves:
(1) a chosen people has failed to keep covenant with key values or principles, (2) the people will suffer calamity as a result of this misbehavior, (3)
such calamity will be avoided by a return to specified righteous action, and
384 Laura King, Narrative, Nuisance, and Environmental Law, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 331,
344 (2014).
385 Id.
386 Id. at 333 (footnote omitted).
387 Burger, supra note 377, at 13.
388 Id. at 20.
389 LAWRENCE BUELL, THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMAGINATION: THOREAU, NATURE WRITING,
AND THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 285 (1995).
390 See supra text accompanying notes 54–59.
391 See generally Scott Slovic, Epistemology and Politics in American Nature Writing: Embedded
Rhetoric and Discrete Rhetoric, in GREEN CULTURE: ENVIRONMENTAL RHETORIC IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (Carl G. Herndl & Stuart C. Brown eds., 1996).
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(4) through proper action the chosen people shall recapture their favored
status and avoid ruin.392

This simple but powerful parable has shaped the leading texts of American environmentalism, from Man and Nature to Silent Spring to An Inconvenient Truth.
The constitutional arguments of Our Children’s Trust participate in the
tradition of environmental jeremiad. This narrative structures the plaintiff’s
complaint and the judge’s order in Juliana.393 As with any due process lawsuit, the broken covenant is the Constitution. The complaint in Juliana
rejects a narrowly legalistic view of constitutional commitment, arguing that
due process rights “reflect the basic societal contract of the Constitution to
protect citizens and posterity from government infringement upon basic
freedoms and basic (or natural) rights.”394 Placing special emphasis on the
mention of “Posterity” in the preamble, the plaintiffs argue that our national
covenant imposes affirmative obligations toward future generations.395
These obligations operate as second-order constraints to counteract political
distortions that “favor influential and entrenched short-term fossil fuel
energy interests to the long-term detriment of Plaintiff.”396
The complaint also looks to the environmental revolution of the early
1970s as a source of fundamental principles. It cites Title I of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which proclaims that “it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means . . . to
the end that the Nation may . . . fulfill the responsibilities of each generation
as trustee of the environment for succeeding generations.”397 The district
court’s order responded in kind, adopting the marriage-equality analogy
advanced by the plaintiffs:
I have no doubt that the right to a climate system capable of sustaining
human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society. Just as marriage is
the “foundation of the family,” a stable climate system is quite literally the
foundation “of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor
progress.”398

Thus the founding covenant incorporates an environmental ethic.
392 Michael Salvador & Todd Norton, The Flood Myth in the Age of Global Climate Change,
5 ENVTL. COMM. 45, 47 (2011).
393 Juliana is the preferred text because, unlike Foster, it is not refracted through the
lens of state administrative law.
394 Juliana Amended Complaint, supra note 358, at 84.
395 Id.
396 Id. at 90. Although the phrase “second-order constraints” is due to Frederick
Schauer, the Juliana plaintiffs go far beyond his “modest constitution.” See Frederick
Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1045, 1051 (2004).
397 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 101(b), 83 Stat.
852 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2012)); see Juliana Amended
Complaint, supra note 358, at 81.
398 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)).
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In the environmental jeremiad, a departure from these fundamental
principles—humility, stewardship, and responsibility toward future generations—risks catastrophic collapse. The Juliana complaint gave an unsparing
assessment: “Recent scientific reports . . . warn of the disintegration of both
the West Antarctic ice sheet and the East Antarctic ice sheet, causing multimeter sea-level rise. Such [events] will devastate coastal regions, including
much of the eastern seaboard. . . . [T]rillions of dollars in property damage
will result.”399 The ecological parable relies on the principle of interconnectedness to render seemingly remote threats imminent and urgent.400
Pointing out that “CO2 emitted by humans persists in the atmosphere for as
long as a millennium or more,” the complaint emphasized the need to
“restore energy balance and avoid crossing tipping points that set in motion
disastrous impacts to human civilization and nature.”401
This metaphor of a “web of life” may be fundamental to ecological narrative, but it sits uneasily with stringent standing requirements developed by
the Supreme Court.402 The magistrate’s recommendation countered the
redressability problem with a hopeful vision of global interdependence and
cooperation: “[R]egulation by this country, in combination with regulation
already being undertaken by other countries, may very well have sufficient
impact to redress the alleged harms.”403 In support of this statement, Magistrate Judge Coffin cited an analogous passage from the Dutch court’s opinion in Urgenda.404
After covenant and betrayal comes redemption. A jeremiad, after all, is
exhortatory, and “the environmental apocalyptic leaves open the possibility
that human intervention can still avoid the looming catastrophe.”405 This
final chapter opens with a pastoral: The narrator “appeals to nostalgia by
invoking a sense of a world that is soon to be lost.”406 For the plaintiffs in
Juliana, the Lost Eden is a stable preindustrial climate, a “very narrow set of
climatic conditions” “on which people depend.”407 Paradise is slipping away,
399 Juliana Amended Complaint, supra note 358, at 68–69.
400 See BUELL, supra note 389, at 302 (describing “the dramatization of networked relationships” as a “structure[ ] of environmental perception” that underlies the “eco-catastrophical metaphor”).
401 Juliana Amended Complaint, supra note 358, at 67.
402 See Andrew Long, Standing & Consensus: Globalism in Massachusetts v. EPA, 23 J.
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 73, 74–75 (2008) (“The very recognition of climate change as creating
cognizable harms requires an acceptance of the interconnectedness of a global environmental system.”); Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental
Law, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 222 (2012) (“The heart of ecological interdependence,
and the premise of the laws it shaped, was that such interests are not less real for being
more complex and remote. The implicit view of standing doctrine so far is that the constitutional concept of justiciability does, in fact, regard them as less real, and remains
attached exclusively to the paradigmatic interests of older conceptions of nature.”).
403 Juliana Findings & Recommendation, supra note 329, at 1269.
404 Id.
405 Burger, supra note 377, at 20.
406 Id.
407 Juliana Amended Complaint, supra note 358, at 68.
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as dramatized by receding rivers of ice: “In 2010, Glacier National Park in
Montana had only twenty-five glaciers larger than twenty-five acres, as
opposed to 150 such glaciers in 1850.”408 But a return to first principles may
yet stave off disaster: “Defendants must act rapidly and effectively to phase
out CO2 emissions so as to restore Earth’s energy balance.”409
Typically, justiciability doctrines erect barriers to the court playing a constructive role in that restoration. In a detailed political-question analysis,
however, Judge Aiken defended the court’s authority to engage: “At its heart,
this lawsuit asks this Court to determine whether defendants have violated
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. That question is squarely within the purview
of the judiciary.”410 But the order did not resolve the ultimate unknown of
whether judicial action could successfully ward off climate catastrophe. Can
the United States through its own actions and in coordination with other
nations still mitigate the climate crisis? Or, have we passed a “point of no
return”?411 As a legal matter, these factual questions go to the redressability
prong of Article III standing. But they take on deeper significance as part of
the environmental apocalyptic—they are the call to action, the admonition
to restore broken promises. Given the profound inertia of the climate system, the present moment is indeed much later than we think.412 But the
ethics of adjudication should conform to a different temporality, one in
which it is never so late as to make striving toward justice futile.
*

*

*

In earlier work, one of us has argued that “merits adjudication of tort
suits promotes consideration of the underlying visions of right, responsibility,
and social order that are adopted (or implied) by judicial decisions.”413
Although tort enjoys a preferred position in some respects, given its explicit
focus on collective norm articulation, these stories from Pakistan, Washington, and Oregon demonstrate that administrative and constitutional adjudication may serve similar ends: to rouse other branches of government to
action and to dignify the narratives of individual litigants. Of course, public
law has no monopoly on these functions either. The environmental apoca408 Id. at 72.
409 Id. at 80.
410 Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1241 (D. Or. 2016). Following Judge
Aiken’s order, the United States filed an answer to the Juliana complaint in which it
asserted twelve separate affirmative defenses, each of which in essence boils down to a
contention that judges should not play a role in determining substantive obligations of the
government vis-a-vis climate change.
411 Id. at 1247.
412 For one recent supporting example, see Chelsea Harvey, Methane May Not Last Long
in the Atmosphere—but It Drives Sea Level Rise for Centuries, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/01/09/methane-may-notlast-long-in-the-atmosphere-but-it-drives-rising-seas-for-hundreds-of-years.
413 Ewing & Kysar, supra note 5, at 356; see also supra Section II.A.
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lyptic ran through the Urgenda decision414 as well as the Second Circuit’s
ruling in American Electric Power.415 Indeed, creative litigation strategies often
blur traditional doctrinal silos. The public trust doctrine is a hybrid creature
that lives somewhere near the border of property and constitutional law.416
Yet the Juliana plaintiffs also speak in the register of tort, invoking a “duty of
care” on the part of the trustee governments.417
This breakdown of arbitrary divisions within the black letter law furnishes yet another proof of this Article’s central premise that catastrophic
harms disrupt legal formalisms. At the moment when natural complexity
overwhelms existing doctrine, legal actors face a choice. Gerald Stern, attorney for the victims at Buffalo Creek, made new claims on the law, seeking
recovery for unrecognized “psychic impairment.”418 But Judge Kaye, speaking for the New York Court of Appeals, backed away from “traditional tort
principles” to avert Con Edison’s “crushing exposure to liability.”419 In
Meyer’s terms, climate change plaintiffs have obliged courts to choose
between denial and nihilism. Most judges have preferred the latter. But, in a
handful of cases, judges have begun to expand the boundaries of their jurisdiction and to forge a new jurisprudence of catastrophe.
CONCLUSION: THE GRACE

OF

RESPONSIBILITY

The error of the nihilist judge is to refuse responsibility over the
extraordinary and the indeterminate. By various means, candidly or covertly,
nihilist judges abdicate their duty to decide because of the complex or dramatic nature of a harm and the remedy it seems to necessitate.420 For
instance, judges seem to believe that, short of ordering a wholesale restructuring of the global economy, their only option in climate change litigation is
414 The Dutch court paid ample attention to the potentially apocalyptic consequences
of climate change: “[T]he warming of the oceans is expected to result in increased hurricane activity, expansion of desert areas and the extinction of many animal species because
of the heat, the latter causing a decline in biodiversity. . . . [W]ithout intervention, the
aforementioned processes will become unstoppable.” Urgenda Decision, supra note 239,
¶ 4.16. The decision likewise dramatized global interconnectedness in order to overcome
the government’s arguments on causation. See id. ¶¶ 4.55, 4.79, 4.81.
415 See Burger, supra note 377, at 40–53.
416 Compare Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W.
L. REV. 239, 274 (1992) (“[T]he public trust doctrine is at bottom a species of property law,
albeit one with overlays of administrative, trust, and constitutional law.”), with Charles F.
Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the
Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 464 (1989) (“The standards for the trust, then, are
best understood as having very broad parameters set as a matter of federal mandate, either
by way of congressional preemption or constitutional law; the constitutional rationale is
more consonant with the whole body of law.”).
417 See Juliana Amended Complaint, supra note 358, at 5, 36, 87, 93.
418 STERN, supra note 12, at 61.
419 Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34, 36 (N.Y. 1985).
420 See supra notes 200–04 and accompanying text.
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to avoid exercising jurisdiction in the first place.421 Again, stuck in a binary
choice between denial and nihilism, most courts opt for the latter.
But Meyer puts forward a third possibility, one that we have not yet discussed. The third posture toward catastrophe seeks neither to domesticate it
immediately nor to surrender to it entirely. Instead, the third posture asks
what catastrophe can teach us about the original source of ethical obligation.
The moment when “we experience our finitude” before the awesomeness of
catastrophe opens up “the possibility of experiencing grace”:
The world is a given, beyond control. And so are we. We see that we did not
make ourselves. For the first time, we have a perspective from which we can
notice that our own urge to make sense of everything is itself a given, a
grace, an unreasonable demand for reason. From the place where reason
fails, we can see reason itself as our calling, a call from outside reason.422

Grace instructs us that catastrophic overturning is the beginning, not the
end, of duty. In the “normal” case, when factual circumstances conform to
legal rules, correct action follows as a matter of mechanical certainty. In contrast, when catastrophe “plow[s] up the ground itself,”423 we are thrust without warning into a position of unasked-for responsibility: “[I]t is only when
the usual social system of rewards for virtue is swept away that one can see an
act done purely from duty.”424
On this point, Meyer draws inspiration from the work of such continental philosophers as Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas. Both argued
that responsibility arises not as obedience to unambiguous rules, but rather
as action in the face of radical uncertainty. Derrida described these undetermined moments as law’s “aporia,” and placed them at the foundation of his
ethical vision: “[A]poretic experiences are the experiences, as improbable as
they are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the decision
between just and unjust is never insured by a rule.”425 For the utilitarian, in
contrast, ethical obligation flows from empirical observations: “Everything
depends on what the facts turn out to be.”426 Levinas reversed this sequence,
arguing that we are saddled with unsought ethical obligations that precede
all knowledge or understanding, indeed all consciousness and subjectivity.427
Catastrophe strips away received normative commands and returns us to
421 See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(“Because resolution of the issues presented here requires identification and balancing of
economic, environmental, foreign policy, and national security interests, ‘an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion’ is required.” (quoting Vieth v.
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004) (plurality opinion))).
422 Meyer, supra note 19, at 22.
423 Id. at 20.
424 Id. at 23.
425 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 CARDOZO L.
REV. 919, 947 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990).
426 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts,
Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 734 (2005).
427 See EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON EXTERIORITY 42–48
(Alphonso Lingis trans., 1969).
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Levinas’s original, presubjective state of obligation. There we act for the first
time in full responsibility for our actions. Meyer attributes this meaning to
catastrophe, but understands it as tragic in itself: “There is a fundamental
injustice in all of this: We didn’t choose ourselves, yet we are obligated. We
are in our very essence something of a catastrophe—ungrounded, under the
yoke of painful obligations we could not expect or imagine.”428
At this point, the patience of a judge—and perhaps our reader—may
have reached a breaking point. What good are these philosophical musings?
An original, infinite, and unreasoned ethical obligation may seem of little
practical value to a court that must deal with the plaintiffs before it who
demand redress for threats of catastrophic harm. After all, the case must be
decided one way or another. Judges cannot remain suspended in aporetic
reverie, however intellectually enticing. But that is precisely the lesson of the
third face of catastrophe: the duty to act in the face of uncertainty is the
purest expression of obligation. “[A]dmitting the inevitability of meaning’s
excess over understanding is the very beginning of responsibility; it is the
surrender that enables analysis to yield to decision, decision to action, and
action to consequence.”429
This Article has discussed a run of cases in which courts did not take that
obligation seriously: Strauss, Comer, Barasich, American Electric Power, Kivalina,
and the rest. By hook430 or by crook,431 judges have found ways to decline
jurisdiction over extraordinary claims for relief. But the routinization of the
hermeneutic of jurisdiction does not render it legitimate. Again, we accept
that the plaintiffs in these cases may well have failed on the merits.432 But
merits adjudication must nevertheless remain available as a public forum for
the common development and articulation of citizens’ rights and duties in
our democratic polity.433 At times of crisis, when our normative universe
tends toward collapse, this demand on the courts becomes ever more insistent. Courts will inevitably fail to mount a complete response to catastrophe,
but they must try. And they may find, as in Urgenda or Juliana, that the trying
itself reshapes the normative landscape.

428 Meyer, supra note 19, at 23.
429 KYSAR, supra note 66, at 195.
430 See supra text accompanying notes 231–33 (describing the use of Article III standing
to dismiss the claims in Kivalina).
431 See supra text accompanying notes 191–98 (describing the use of procedural subterfuge to dismiss the claims in Comer).
432 Tort doctrine poses many obstacles to the climate change plaintiff. See Kysar, supra
note 138; supra Section III.A.
433 Cf. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 301–04 (2011) (“[P]ublic
processes of courts contribute to the functioning of democracies and give meaning to democratic aspirations that locate sovereignty in the people, constrain government actors,
develop processes for norm elaboration, and insist on the equality of treatment under
law.”).

